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ABSTRACT

The Ethics of the AIDS-Afflicted Physician.
The death of voluntary compliance!
by
William R. Kemey
Dr. Craig W alton, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Philosophy
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This argument w ill examine the ethical issues, policies, and controversy
surrounding the AIDS afflicted health care worker, especially the HIV positive
Physician / Surgeon. The discussion encompasses evaluation of rights of the
individual, natural and otherwise, with focus on the rights of confidentiality,
privacy, and disability rights and related laws that pertain to afflicted individuals.
The discussion will exam ine the ethical responsibilities of the HIV positive
health care worker within the medical practice, along with issues o f the patient
rights of informed consent, institutional responsibility, and the policy positions of
professional associations representing afflicted individuals. Protective
legislation for victims of communicable disease will be balanced against the
issues of public health with focus on the legislative beginnings of these
protective laws, and protections offered by the various laws, common and
otherwise. Policy recommendations for the treatment of these Individuals and
those that are affected by their actions will be offered.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
The issues of AIDS and HIV infection are on the mind of the nation. Caring
for infected individuals involves the problems of how to m itigate risk and screen
patients for the protection of the caregiver. The problem of HIV infected
healthcare workers, specifically HIV infected surgeons, involves risk to the very
individuals these caregivers are sworn to help. Yet, mitigation o f these risks
must also take place, and that means a call for change from current policy
positions. This thesis will offer a solution to current policy problems and will
base the argument for change on moral positions that are not influenced by the
current practice of statistical determination of risk. A change from the status quo
is often a painful and fearful process. When examining issues that appear, on
the surface, to be of concem to all players, many problems arise to cloud the
already murky water. Among these problems are the balance o f individual
versus community rights, discrimination, justice and faimess, and issues of law;
each of which poses a roadblock on the way to change. An argument in favor of
change must tem per individual concerns against a larger community of need. A
full fledged stand in favor of genereü utility would trounce the value of the
individual. Yet by contrast, to allow a select group of individuals to dictate
societal behavior ignores the value of the common good sought by those in a
1
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particular community. To stand firmly on either side of this issue denies a sense
of responsibility to those on the other side. W hile this may sound as political as
standard fence sitting, the real answer is not to sit on the fence, but to tear it
down in favor of a better, more just and equitable solution for all.
The argument o f this thesis is a concise and determined effort to remove the
fence of discrim ination against infected individuals and to build a base of
responsibility and positive action based on individual and community needs
and concerns. The AIDS and HIV issue is real and a passionate subject for the
public at large. It has been the subject of much debate in the classrooms, the
courtrooms, the boardrooms, and the bedrooms of the nation. The subject for
this argument will be the individual afflicted with the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus or HIV, who is also a surgeon, a health care professional who is exposed
to and potentially exposing others to the HIV infection. ’ Current policy
regarding these individuals, that they “should refrain from performing exposure
prone procedures”, and the ‘voluntary compliance’ expected of this policy lacks
the necessary strength to obligate individual acquiescence.
The AIDS epidem ic is a powerful topic that has engendered an environment
of fear and distrust of our fellow citizens. Fear is a powerful affliction. "From the
earliest reports of a serious new illness spread through an infectious agent, a
secondary epidem ic of fear has accompanied the epidemic of illness and death,
generating a wave o f discrimination against those identified with the disease”
(Burris, et. al. 1993, 297).* This pattem is well known throughout history. From
the black death in Europe, typhoid fever in American cities, to the Acquired
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Immune Deficiency Syndrome of contemporary society, fear has plagued
society's treatment of afflicted individuals. Uniquely, the issue of contemporary
societies dealings with the AIDS-afflicted individual "has not focused narrowly
on those diagnosed with AIDS, but has reached out to touch asymptomatic
people infected with HIV and even un-infected people suspected of being
infected because of their membership in so-called high risk groups or their
association with people who have AIDS" (Burris et. al. 1997, 297). Such
discrimination begs the question of individual rights and argues for protection
and defense.
In Chapter Two we w ill examine the issues of rights. The language of ‘rights’
has been embroiled in a bitter war of verbiage and assertions on each side of
the issues. No matter which side of the fence on which one stands, each has a
habit of trying to overpower the others with strong language about “their” rights
and how the other person should be respectful of what is due to us. “The
language of rights is the language of no compromise. The winner takes all and
the loser has to get out of town. The conversation is over” (Glendon 1991, 9). '
This has not been overlooked by the modem scholar or legislator. The issue of
rights is very prominent within the social framework of modem society and is
currently debated on several levels; here, individual rights and the rights of
society are two conflicting areas of discussion. Each offers different domains of
concem and although these areas are of importance, it seems that no matter
which area of rights is discussed, there is a need to balance any assertion of
rights by an individual o r group with that of the other individuals or groups that
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may be affected, in other words, an assertion of rights cannot be valid unless
there is a determination of justice for those required to respect those rights.
Rights discussions are often complex and often delve into a realm of the
obscure and controversial, such as the notion of "natural rights”. A discussion of
natural rights is one that has had perplexing consequences for much of our
societal and political thinking for many years. Some would argue that the
distinct concept of "human” or "fundamental” rights is unique and identifiable.
Yet, some would state that these are m erely notions of convenience without
which the human creature could not survive. Still others would argue that the
‘natural rights’ are derived from the state o f nature (or our human nature or our
natural condition) and are those with which mankind is endowed regardless of
an individual’s place in the world. Others still would argue that these rights are
divinely bestowed by their God. A dissenting opinion on the whole subject
holds that the entire argument, irrespective of one’s position, is merely a
semantic trap serving no useful purpose, that there are no rights but only
politically conflicting claims.
Chapter Three will attempt to examine many of the existing laws and
protective legislation that has been drafted. We will examine the current
protection that has been offered to individuals with HIV and the strong treatment
of individuals that have been deemed a possible direct threat to others.
Chapter Four will examine the framing of these laws, what legal basis has been
used in their formulation, and how some individuals are favored under these
protective guidelines.
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in many instances the issues and responses by both individuals and groups
are grounded in philosophical chest thumping, which fails to offer reasonable
solutions or position stances relative to their individual or group doctrine. If no
solution or policy is offered, then the situation becomes disconnected and leaps
into the arena of individuals and groups seeking to define what they are and the
roles they are to play. If a group or individual only redefines the problem and
offers no real solution, then the old adage, “if you are not part of the solution,
then you are part of the problem”, should be invoked. C lear policy must be
proposed in any argument for or against current practices. Many players in this
dilemma will seek only to acquire a protective stance for themselves or their
members. But this, again, is only a form of posturing and is defensive at the
best. Sometimes it appears that professional associations may be the most
adept players in this posturing methodology. Chapter Five will offer what is
believed to be a reasonable solution to the policy dilemma. As current policy
falls drastically short in achieving its goals, that of protecting all parties involvedthe policy proposed herein will attempt to give clear guidelines for
implementation and alternatives to current operational deficiencies. I will also
attempt to give fair representation to oppositions to the proposed policy and
address expected objections in a straightforward manner.
An extended, broad based deliberation on the value of public protection
policy focused on AIDS and HIV Is beyond the scope of this thesis. * This
present argument shall focus on a single segment of the potential afflicted
population, that of HIV positive physicians, specifically HIV positive surgeons.
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and their extended risk to the general population via exposure-prone surgical
procedures performed in the operating room theater.
This argument has many sides; The afflicted surgeons will claim that their
positive status is not statistically relevant in the area of significant risk. They will
also claim disability status under long-standing, and more current laws, and
protection under the veil of privacy extended to all “medical patients” atxsut their
personal medical history. Patients will take them to task on the issues of
autonomy and choice, as well as identifiable and significant risk. Patients are
now questioning the HIV status of the provider and the resultant scream of
disability rights from the infected individual providers is deafening. One side
bellows “patient rights” in the realm of informed consent and protection from
harm, and the other shrieks “privacy protection” of confidential inform ation and
the rights of disabled individuals. Neither gives any whisper of responsibility to
the other or to their concems. Patients feel the surgeons’ position is a violation
of the public's belief, justified or not. that, in all instances, the physician must
place the patient's welfare above his own. Both will rely on the epidemiology of
disease transmission fo r the support of their individual positions. Each will also
offer policy positions that are categorically unacceptable to the other. Here the
problem arises. Each side is entirely correct in its assertions. If both sides are
correct then the issues that are being argued must be removed from the
bargaining table and a search for common ground must be initiated.

Here is

the reason for undertaking to propose an ethical policy position which will
attempt to appease the anger on both sides.
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What issues may be able to effectively solve the dilemma? The policy
position to be offered here is ethically based and will dismiss much of the
scientific statistical argument, as outlined in Chapter Three, as not relevant to
the discussion because it supports both sides of diametrically opposed
positions. The policy will also offer a reasonable approach to a solution that
involves all players in the discussion and may lead to a gradual rebuilding of
public trust and confidence in a health care system fraught with chaos and
infighting.

It should be viewed as the ultimate compromise seeking to bring the

sides together and offer each a solution to their own concems that is at least
palatable to the other. We do not claim that this is the only solution, but that it is
one that will try to consider the positions of each side and look for common
ground. We also do not claim to be able to please all of the players. Some
individuals will undoubtedly be offended, affected, and harmed. This is
because some individuals' rights, justified or not, may be ignored in favor of the
greater “community of need". The issues of public health that surround this
pandemic problem must not be ignored because of any one group of
individuals, even professionals. The issues of “community” will be the
grounding for the philosophical support for the policy offered. Any ethical
determination must stand on the basis of the “broad community of need" rather
than solely on individuals and groups. Chapter Six will show that the
communitarian stand is rational and objective in its approach to the problems
we have outlined. When addressing a pandemic problem, as the issue of HIV
and HIV infection have been determined to be, aggressive and decisive policy
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must be enacted to offer the public the protection and confidence in the health
care system that so succinctly defines pandemia. Anything short of aggressive
policy appears weak and ineffective in addressing the concems of the
community as a whole.
Chapter Seven will offer a supporting ethical stand based on the surgeon's
ability to seek and achieve well-being under the current approach to the
problem and the current "should refrain from the performance of ‘invasive
procedures'” edict. The chapter w ill also examine the concept of justice as it
relates to the patient / surgeon relationship and how the existing policy offers an
injustice to the patient.
The conclusion will attempt to pull the entire argument together for a final
examination.
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1. The terms ‘AIDS afflicted’, ‘HIV infected’, and the like, will be used
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(New Haven; Yale University Press, 1993), 297.
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4. see; for example; Amatai Etzioni, ed.. The Essential Communitarian
Reader, (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), xxv, 131; Amatai Etzioni, Rights
and the Common Good, The Communitarian Perspective, (New York, St.
Martins Press, 1995) 20, 75.
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CHAPTER 2

RIGHTS
Individual rights and responsibility seem to go hand-in-hand, but no matter
where one goes today, he o r she hears claims and assertions of rights but
rarely a whisper about responsibility. When individuals place “rights” above the
welfare and concem for others, they make the most grievous of all errors, that of
trying to be a moral exception. This is not to say that individual rights and
liberties are unimportant. On the contrary, but rights claim ed and liberties
demanded is a one-sided logic counter to the concept of “respect for all”.
We all make declarations and contentions about “our” rights. Very often the
debate ends up with the “claim s that whatever right is under discussion at the
moment trumps every other consideration” (Glendon 1991, 8). ' Many times we
do so without discussing the implications of these claims and the ultimate fallout
associated with the positions taken. “My rights” are of extrem e importance in
the discussion, whereas “your rights” are important only as long as they do not
compete with “my rights”! The assertion of rights may be made by individuals,
or by groups on behalf of individuals. They can be discussed in a framework
that is legal or ethical, and the goal of any group attem pting to assert a right is
that there is established a legal framework within which to assert that right,
thereby giving a certain am ount of justification for the assertion. This framework
10
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may use arguments that are thought of as prim a facie, or “on the face of it”, and
that will require no further explanation other than the stating o f the right and the
claim of the “human experience”. Some of these will be asserted as “natural” or
“God given”, those that cannot be taken away regardless of that which befalls
the offended individual.

A common question asked about the existence of

fundamental moral rights m ay be answered by the simple reasoning from the
facts of human nature (Wellman 1985,170-71). ^ Certain facts about human
nature, that all human beings seek to prolong life and shun injury or pain, seem
to imply, de fa cto , that all humans have a natural right to life and a moral right
not to be injured.

Natural Rights
Natural Rights have always been In the background for scholars and
individuals in their declarations of rights. They have been called 'inalienable',
“fundamental”, ‘common’, and even “divine” rights. Thomas Jefferson in his
writing of the Declaration of Independence based the entire document on the
concept that all men are “endowed by their creator with certain inalienable
rig h ts;... life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”. T h e term ‘natural rights’ is
generally restricted to those [rights] which are conceived of as more
fundamental than others, from which the others may be deduced, or to which
the others are only auxiliary” (Ritchie 1952, 80-81). ^
The defense of the natural rights is easier in a group. When a man is
attacked and his life is in jeopardy, is it not easier to defend one’s life with the

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12
help of others? Men bind together in commonwealths for “the foresight of their
own preservation”, the protection of their most basic natural right, that of life
itself (Hobbes 1651, Chap. 17). *
Much of the grounding for the assertion of rights for individuals lies in the
philosophical case for the concept of rights claims. Self preservation, that of the
continuation of life, is one of the pillars in the rights discussions.
Thomas Hobbes stated that, “Man has, through the use of his own power
and will, the freedom to preserve his own nature; that is to say of his own life;
and consequently, of doing anything, which in his own judgment, and reason,
shall conceive to be the [means of the preservation]” (Hobbes 1651, Chap. 14). ^
For Hobbes the issue that made it a fundamental natural right was that man was
also bound and forbidden to do “that, which was destructive of his life.” The
endeavor to be and to continue to be is not granted by human artifice but is
natural to all living beings.

He believed that man had the right to his life

(nature) and was bound by the law of nature in the preservation of that life.
Hobbes also professed to a natural equality among men. By equality he meant,
not just physical equality (which he often acknowledged as a false assumption),
but in aspects of power relative to a consensual social contract. That is, we are
equal in that no one of us is willing to go without consideration, and anyone can
be outdone by others if this is allowed. Hobbes claimed that moral action, and
constraint, is only possible as long as this “political equality” existed. Hobbes
continues with the community' aspects that appear to be so important. Civil
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rights pertain to the concept of community, or to use Hobbes’ term:
commonwealth. These, unlike natural rights, are granted by mutual agreement.
As a result of man's formation of the commonwealth, the power behind the
individual in the enforcement of the natural rights and civil rights (the covenants,
or agreements among men, for Hobbes) become instituted.
The concept of ‘social contract' does have its limitations. What happens
when a man refuses to submit to the social collective will, To march to the beat
of a different drummer”, if you will? The distinction must be drawn between
Natural rights and Civil rights. While the line is wide and gray, it nevertheless
does exist and is the basis for much of the law in the world today. Natural rights
pertain to man in his person or existence; the right of a man to be secure in his
intellect, to act as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, but always
with the respectful awareness that his actions are not injurious to others and
their (equal) natural rights. The natural rights of man cannot be taken from him.
The power of the intellect, the rights of the mind, his religious beliefs, selfpreservation, are all within the power of the individual; these he never
surrenders. These ‘natural rights' when asserted as a group and
acknowledged by the group as rights that are applicable to all is a basis on
which the group of civil rights is then made enforceable by laws. Many would
argue that this community of rights is a natural and obvious evolution of the
nature of things and the often sought pursuit of happiness.
A collateral condition of the pursuit of happiness, not made by Hobbes
except as a generality, is the concept of man having his basic needs met
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without restriction and to not be subjected to gratuitous pain or suffering. The
concept of basic needs includes the right to adequate food, water, clothing,
shelter, and medical treatments. (Hobbes 1651, Chap. 27). " The issue of not
merely suffering pain is simply regarded as benign treatment by others. This
will all fall into the Hobbesian definition or classification of the broad concept of
justice. These are the common core or the fundamental rights that all human
creatures experience. Michael Freemen notes that these rights are a
fundamental part of the human experience and that the denial of these rights is
a direct affront to the concept of being human: T hose rights cannot be denied
without a potentially critical loss of what constitutes being human" (Ritchie, 27).
This holistic view of the human condition regarding natural rights is consistent
with the views expressed by Hobbes, but carries with it a form to be considered;
to wit, that a basic part of being human is an essential right to “a hope by their
industry” of obtaining the aforementioned fundamental human needs, wants,
eurid desires (Hobbes 1651, Chap. 13). ' These are an essential part of the
human organism and cannot be denied, neglected, or rejected by anyone least
of all the individual himself.
Natural rights, as shown by Hobbes, cannot be given to or taken from the
individual, regardless of the circumstances. The most essential element for the
purposes of this essay is the concept of life and the protection of that life. As we
have shown, life is a right which man may defend under all offenses designed
to relieve him of that right. But the concept of 'natural rights' is not without its
detractors, and Jerem y Bentham was one of the most eloquent.
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Jeremy Bentham
Bentham rejected the concept of natural rights as an elusive concept created
by man. When a man asserts he has natural rights he creates a situation where
he expresses a need for some consideration relative to his life and possible
happiness. His inability to express this need in any tangible way gives rise to
the claim of natural rights: when a man has no political power in his possession
or no support of the political system, he asserts he has a natural right. He
creates a reason for the wanting or wishing for natural rights, the want of
happiness. He may also assert his 'natural rights' when faced with the
elements of oppression, injustice, or tyranny. But m erely wishing that
something is true or real does not make it so; "\vishings for rights, are not rights;
- a reason for wishing that a certain right were established, is not that right want is not supply - hunger is not bread” (Bentham, 1843). * The argument can
be persuasive, though. When a man has been beaten out of political grounding
for his rights assertion he will cling to the thread of natural right, “that which has
been bestowed by that kind goddess and govemess of Nature, an Indisputable
legitimacy. If he can convince you, or get you to acknowledge, the existence of
this or that 'natural rig h f” he has “the hope of getting you to acknowledge the
existence of a corresponding political right, and in getting your assistance in
enabling him to posses it” (Ogden 1932, 121). *
Rights do not stand alone for Bentham. Obligations are an integral part of the
equation that must be accounted for. Bentham stated that, “for every right which
the law confers on one party....it thereby imposes on some other party a duty or
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obligation” (Bentham, 1789). " For Bentham, rights and obligations must go
hand-in-hand. Those charged with the handing out of these corresponding
benefits and burdens must be aware that any conference of rights in the interest
of liberty also is a restriction of the same concept. “According to the principle of
utility [a legislator] ought never to impose a burden except for the purpose of
conferring a benefit of a clearly greater value. It is impossible to create rights, to
impose obligations, to protect the person, life, reputation, property, substance,
liberty itself, except at the expense of liberty.” “The law [govemment] cannot
create rights except by creating corresponding obligations. It cannot create
rights and obligations without creating offenses, it cannot command nor forbid
without restraining the liberty of individuals. It appears, then, the citizen cannot
acquire rights except by sacrificing a part of his liberty” (Bentham 1864). "
Some may confuse this with Hobbes. When Hobbes spoke of man losing his
liberty, he was speaking of “laying down” or giving up a right; thereby divesting
himself of the liberty. Bentham, on the other hand, was speaking of the
acquisition of rights, thereby creating obligations and offenses, leading to the
loss of liberty. Bentham's argument that rights can only be conferred by positive
law neglects the issues of what it is to be fundamentally human:
You hear a multitude of professors, of jurists,... of philosophers, who
make the laws o f nature echo in your ears. ... The phrase is sometimes
modified, and we find in its place, natural right, natural equity, the rights
o f man, etc. They are, at the bottom, only the arbitrary principle.... The
object is, to make our opinions triumph without the trouble of comparing
them with the opinions of others. ...It is no longer the moral sense- it is the
common sense... and common sense is a sense which belongs to
everybody; [and] then he will take good care in speaking for everybody
[and] make no account of those who do not think as he does (Bentham
1864). ’2
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This strong criticism of natural rights is extreme, even for Bentham, but does
show the fervor with which the rights argument is often put forward and
attacked. He neglects the issues of human self-preservation and the natural
instinctive traits this self defense invokes. Contemporary philosophers have
continued in the discussion, but much current work is an examination of the
interdependency o f rights and responsibilities. One leading example is the
work of Mary Ann Glendon.

Glendon and the Communitarians
Contemporary Viewpoints
Natural Rights are also asserted to have a form of precision or finality in the
discussion, if I have a 'natural right* then there is nothing you or anyone else
can do to relieve me of that right. Mary Ann Glendon asserts: T h e exaggerated
absoluteness of our American rights rhetoric is closely bound up with its other
distinctive traits—a near-silence concerning responsibility, and a tendency to
envision the rights-bearer as a lone autonomous individual" (Glendon 1991,
45). This silence concerning responsibility is a concept that weakens any talk of
‘inalienable’ rights. If the concept of natural or inalienable rights is to survive,
then the concept of responsibility must also play in the discussion. One cannot
confer preference without conferring a corresponding limitation. Glendon
continues with, "people are well aware of their rights but fail to grasp the other
half of the democratic equation... [that of] m eeting personal responsibilities,
serving the community, and participating in th e nation’s political life" (Glendon
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1991, 76). The concept of community service and community standards
regarding moral codes brings in an argum ent for a community perspective.
The seeking of the ‘common good’ is the gauge that is used when the
community examines moral codes and rights that seek to be upheld. This might
be the Supreme Good, as in the polis fo r Aristotle, the ‘most good’ for the
utilitarian; but the focus and definition o f the moral good outlined here is really
not at stake. What is the issue is the assertion of rights and obligations by
individuals that conflict with the common good, however it is defined. “A true
moral right is one that is demonstrably justifiable by relation to the common
good, whether it is actually recognized o r not [a n d ]... Individual[s] have no
moral rights which conflict with the common good" (Hobhouse 1965, 40).

[For

the purposes of this thesis we will stipulate that the issues of tyranny,
oppression and injustice can only be classified as "against" the common good
and can only be viewed as moral evils ]
In this way, the common good’ can become a general common ground for
coordinating rights with duties. One can argue that the education of school
children serves the common good, that a national patriotism also serves this
aim; each may have a certain function to perform thereby creating an obligation
of society to facilitate or maintain conditions under which these functions can
best be fulfilled. Rights, as they have come to be understood, have an
individualistic tone that makes them inconsistent with the community aspects on
which we all depend.
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And a community may be said to exert a form of its own rights.
Communitarian philosophy has "made the question of balance between
individual rights and social responsibility, between autonomy and the common
good, a m ajor concern". Amitai Etzioni, a strong voice in the Communitarian
movement, states that “there is a gap between rights and rightness that cannot
be closed without a richer moral vocabulary - one that invokes principles of
decency, duty, responsibility, and the common good, among others” (Etzioni
1998, xi).

A right to the freedom of speech does not make all forms of speech

‘right speech’. A right to shout ‘nigger* at African Americans, or ‘Jew* at those of
Jewish descent, does not make it a right thing to do. The corresponding right
also does not give the holder a "sufficient reason to perform" that right (Etzioni
1998, xxxiii).

Autonomy
Arguments about autonomy often involve solely-individual thinking but may
also be seen to involve community rights via the preservation of choices for the
commonwealth. As we have stated, individual moral rights cannot conflict with
the community of good, but part of the community of good may be said to
involve individual freedoms and control.
Around the core of any ethical right clusters an assortment of
associated ethical liberties, claims, powers and immunities. What ties
these ethical elements together into a single right is the way in which
each associated element contributes some sort of freedom or
control... with respect to the possessor of the right. Because freedom
and control are two aspects of autonomy, any ethical right can be
thought of as a system of ethical autonomy (Wellman 1985, 329).
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Problematic to the whole discussion of autonomy is the question where to
draw the line between individual autonomy, the rights associated with this
concept, and the point where the "allowance" of these rights infringes on the
rights of others, on the/r autonomous individuality? The respect fo r the
autonomous individual is central to the good that will be derived from this
respect for the whole of the community group. If you respect my autonomy now,
then when the time comes, I will respect yours. What I do not say at this point in
my assertion of these rights is that my respect then, will be predicated on the
concept of your not violating any of my perceived rights at that time. This
collective benefit that is asserted is often termed a form of social contract or
agreement by which persons live within a community.
This sense of autonomy, or the ability of individuals to be masters of their
own fate or to control their own destiny, is essential to the formation of rights by
both individuals and groups. The problem with (literally) autonomous decision
making is the ability of the individual (or group working on behalf of the
individual) to neglect a sense of fairness with respect to other individuals.
Respect for the individual is not lost with the medical community and the
autonomous patient is at the forefront of many medical ethics discussions. This
w ill involve many issues, one of which is patient decision making and control
over decisions that were historically left to a more paternalistic physician
community. Patient autonomy has left the medical community with a patient
population that is more informed (whether actually or legally informed) and
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prepared, no, really, demanding, to have a say in the care that they receive or
do not receive, and who does or does not provide the care.
Autonomy is an issue central to health care and will never be out of the
discussion as it is a basic tenet afforded to patients. Part of the discussion of
autonomy is within the disability rights issues that arise out of the concept of the
infected individual health care workers who are also at the same time "patients"
in their own right - and who therefore are afforded all of the same rights as other
patients (i.e. autonomy, confidentiality, privacy, etc.). The control discussed
earlier is a legal ability on the part of the claimant to force compliance with the
asserted right thereby affirming an ethical autonomy for the individual.

Conclusion
As we have already shown, one cannot create or assert the concept of
‘rights’ without assigning, creating, and obligating responsibilities.
Responsibility places each member of the community in a ‘double relation’. "He
has a share in it. That is the sum of his rights. He has to contribute his share.
That is the sum of his duties. Rights and duties thus rest on the same ethical
foundation" (Hobhouse 1965, 39).
The issues of the rights for the infected health care workers w ill also focus on
existing political rights that have been clearly established. Currently, as we
shall see, there are strong protections for the infected individuals under existing
disability laws. Yet, while the protections are powerful, the laws are not without
areas of dispute or areas that are vague and ambiguous. This scenario will
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always lead to judicial challenges to the laws, or claim s and assertions made in
court settings that are not definitely within the scope of the law, but were "clearly
within the spirit of the law”. The disabled individuals within our society have, as
of late, begun to receive what has been considered to be their appropriate
participatory societal opportunities. These disabled ‘rights' have been at the
forefront of recent legislation, namely the Americans with Disabilities Act

and

many a case is pending in the court systems of this nation with the assertion of
these new ‘rights'. The courts have been challenged in the enforcement of
these ‘rights' and in their efforts to achieve a sense of equity for these
individuals often create a form of common law that augm ents or modifies the
ambiguous laws handed down from the legislature. W hile the issues of the law
pertain to the rights o f these individuals, they are better reviewed within the
realm of a discussion on justice than on rights. (See Chapter 7)
Any argument by surgeons in favor of any "right” that does not accept the
necessary responsibilities that correspond to that right on the other side of the
spectrum, will fail. Patients subjected to potential grievous harm by the
assertion of the rights of the physician, without the patients’ consent, will
ultimately fall victim to the rights debate. One could fall back to a Hobbesian
analysis and say this would violate the patient’s right to self preservation by
placing the physician’s rights above his or hers with the result being a loss of
the patient’s life. Physicians seeking to advance their own rights over those of
the patient, particularly at the expense of the patient’s well-being, will lose the
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trust of a public, already unsympathetic to the rights of wealthy individuals who,
at least perceptually, may be viewed as only seeking to preserve their wealth.
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CHAPTER 3

DISABIUTY LAW
W ith almost as much fervor and passion as was exhibited in the 1960s in the
battle o f m inority citizens for their civil rights, the 1990s has become the
battleground for the disabled. The difference between the two issues is wide
but the approach and subsequent confrontations in and out of the courtroom are
inexorably linked. This chapter w ill examine the current disability laws that exist
and the areas of each that are applicable to the AIDS afflicted individual. Terms
used in the laws are similar. Specifically we w ill concentrate on what
constitutes disability, the otherwise qualified' and direct threat’ portions of
these laws, and examine the concept of risk regarding infected healthcare
providers. We will also explore some of the case law that has been handed
down by the courts regarding these persons, and examine policy positions
taken as a result of this case law.
The disabled individual, classically, has been viewed as one who, through
some unfortunate accident either from birth, trauma, or other mishap, has been
rendered less than ‘complete’ (or less than ‘perfect’) as an organism. The result
of this perception is that, for years the "im perfect” individuals of our society were
sheltered or shut away from the mainstream of the population. This was done
for m any reasons and is grounded in the long tradition of humanity,
26
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ancient cultures "deformed infants were sometimes slain as monstrous; even in
such advanced societies as that of ancient Greece, the abandonment of infants
could be tolerated." ' This has been a common practice in many civilizations
where the survival of the tribe or clan was dependent on the overall health and
strength of tribal members. When an individual became a burden on others,
they were cast aside and left to fend for themselves. For the elderly and the
disabled or sickly, this was often a death sentence. This still occurs in the
modem world. W hile this historical background is not essential to this particular
study, the wide swing of the proverbial pendulum may have come back to haunt
those that would have considered the disabled as anything less than
‘complete’. This sense of ‘completeness’ was true of the civil rights movement
with formation of the concept of affirmative action, and it will also be true with the
treatment of the disabled in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and more recent the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [ADA]. ' The broad implications that
have arisen since the passage of these two key pieces of legislation will impact
society for many years to come. As will be seen in the pages to come, just as
the civil rights movement sought to raise the social conscience regarding
African Americans and wound up with an broad minority definition that Included
women, Hispanics and others; so the quest for the rights o f the disabled will
see the broad sweep of the brush of inclusion regarding what is, and is not,
handicapped. No longer will disabled status apply only to the victim of cerebral
palsy or the wheelchair-bound accident victim. The concept of disability will
include those with unseen disabilities. People with mental handicaps.
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recovering abusers of both alcohol and drugs, persons with communicable
diseases, in fact, any person who has a physical or mental problem that
"substantially limits one or more of his/her major life activities" is now
considered disabled. This determination allows unique protection and special
treatment under the current laws of the nation much as the actions created by
the civil rights movement were used to correct past injustices.
Much could be written on this broad subject and the need to narrow the focus
for this work seems essential. Current discussion will concentrate on the
unseen disability of the communicable disease and the impact on society for
providing inclusion regarding this type of individual. This is not meant to be a
sociological discussion, m erely an examination of the evolution for inclusion of
these afflicted individuals on the nature of ‘disability’, and how that was
accomplished through the current legislation and subsequent court challenges
that have arisen. This work will attempt to examine these issues and will
concentrate on the effect that this determination will have on Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrom e-afflicted individuals, specifically the approach to the AIDS
afflicted surgeon and student and their ability to participate in health care
programs. ®
The beginning of the disability revolution started with the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 which states in section 504 (hereinafter, “section 504") that:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States...
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive Agency.
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The key wording of "otherwise qualified" is a phrase that means to set aside the
affliction of the individual and examine his status of performance if he were not
so afflicted. If the individual is "otherwise qualified" then he must be afforded
the opportunity to participate irrespective of his handicap. Section 504 is lim ited
in its jurisdiction. The limitation involves activities that receive federal funding or
are actual programs sponsored by a govemmental or executive agency.
Implementation and jurisdiction over the act fell to the U.S. Department of
Health, Education and W elfare (later transferred to the Department of Health
and Human Services in 1980) which issues the implementation regulations.
The determination of what constitutes a handicapped person is generally
defined in both the act and section 504 to mean:
Any person who (i)has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more m ajor life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. *
The regulations further define the terminology of ‘physical or mental
impairment" to be:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including
speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary;
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. ^
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome falls under the Act in the physiology of
the immune system which is a part of the lymphatic system. The definition will
also cover persons who test positive for the virus but who have not presented
with symptoms. The inclusion of ‘asymptomatic’ individuals is a wide step from
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the traditional concept of ‘disabled* and a clear expansion of the classical
interpretation.
The first challenge to the provision of the Act on the basis of contagious
disease involved a schoolteacher in Florida who sued the local school board for
discrimination based on Section 504. In School Board o f Nassau County v.
Arline (1987), the local school board attempted to term inate the employment of
a classroom teacher with TB. " Gene Arline, the school teacher, claimed
handicapped status under the provisions of the Section 504 and sued for
unlawful discharge. At the D istrict Court level the plaintiffs motion was denied
with the court stating that It was "difficult... to conceive that Congress intended
contagious disease to be included within the definition of a handicapped
person" (Tumer 1988, 2, 23). ^ That finding was overturned by the Court of
Appeals which stated that the Section 504 clearly included individuals with a
contagious disease but remanded the case for additional finding on the status
of Arline’s risk of (cross) infection and of that risk, precluding the plaintiff from
being "otherwise qualified" (11th Cir. 1984). ® This also brought in the issue of
the school board being able to make "reasonable accommodation" for the
plaintiff to resume her duties as a classroom teacher. In a landmark decision in
Arline (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals
should be affirmed and that the plaintiff was a handicapped individual under the
meaning of Section 504. W riting for the seven-justice majority. Justice Brennan
spoke of protecting the handicapped not only from simple prejudice, but from
“archaic attitudes and laws" (Tum er 1988, 2 ,1 ).
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The Supreme Court used the general definition of handicapped individual in
assessing the plaintiffs case and found (i) that one or more of her major life
activities were limited, due to her earlier hospitalizations for said disease, and
(ii) that this clearly established that the plaintiff had a record of such an
impairment. The justices further assessed the plaintiff for the physiological
inclusion under section 504 and clearly found that the plaintiffs tuberculosis
clearly constitutes a respiratory condition. In its arguments before the Court, the
school board conceded that contagious disease could fall under the stipulations
of Section 504, but further argued that this was irrelevant since the plaintiff had
not been discharged for having the condition, but for the threat that she posed to
others. This was dismissed by Brennan and the Court as more of the same
prejudiced, ignorant attitudes and fears. It did move the Court to attempt to
determine if the plaintiff is "otherwise qualified " and if the school board should
be required to adopt an accommodation for the handicapped individual. These
further fact findings were remanded to the district court who adopted a set of
factors presented by the American Medical Association (hereinafter, AM A). In
an amicus curiae ("friend of the court") brief, the AMA stated the assessment
should be based on:
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of
the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what
is the potential harm to third parties), and (d) the probabilities the disease
will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm (Tum er 1988, 2,
2 ).
The criterion sought by the court, and eventually adopted by the Supreme
Court, was if the individual offers a significant risk and that reasonable
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accommodation will not eliminate the risk, then the individual is not “othenwise
qualified” under Section 504. Brennan wrote, “ the fact that some persons who
have contagious disease may pose a threat to others under certain
circumstances does not justify excluding from coverage of the Act a ll persons
with actual or perceived contagious diseases” (Tumer 1988, 2, 2).
As a result of this decision by the Court, the US Solicitor General, also in an
amicus curiae brief, raised the question as to whether a person can be
contagious without having a physical impairment and could this ever constitute
discrimination based on handicap? The Court skirted the issue stating that the
argument was misplaced since the facts in Arline had given rise to a physical
impairment. As a result of this judgment by the Court and its apparent
reluctance to take a stand on the issue of asymptomatic AIDS patients.
Congress moved sw iftly to, in essence, legislatively reverse the Court. In a
proposed amendment to the Civil Rights Restoration Act (hereinafter, CRRA),
which had passed by overriding a presidential veto. Senators Tom Harkin and
Gordon Humphrey introduced the concept of “direct threat” . The amendment
states:
...Section 504 does not include those who, because of a contagious
disease, “would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals” (Gerry 1988, 182). •
The Senators were quick to add in the discussion that the amendment would
not change the current law regarding “reasonable accommodation”. The
problem with this amendment to the CRRA is that it left the possibility of broad
judicial interpretation of the “direct threat” language and, depending on the level
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of judicial scrutiny applied to an individual case, might find certain persons
outside the scope of Section 504. The implication is clear and the inference is
strong that persons with HIV or AIDS might be left out (Gerry 1988, 183). The
courts were soon to solve this very problem.
Even though the Supreme Court had opted not to decide the issue of
discrimination involving the AIDS afflicted individual the year before, the
decision in Arline was a clear guideline for the treatment of all individuals with a
contagious disease.
In Chalk v. United States D istrict Court (1987) this exact issue was brought
before the bench.

The issues in Chalk are much of the same issues raised in

Arline, but the difference is that it involved the AIDS virus and factors in all of the
paranoia, prejudice, and hysteria that has surrounded this disease. The courts
have, in certain instances, participated in this hysteria. In fact the whole basis
for Chaik involves a propagation of this hysteria. Vincent Chalk, a teacher of
hearing-impaired students, was removed from his classroom duties by his
employer (and offered an adm inistrative position) due to the fear of apparent
risk Chalk imposed. In the district court, the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary
injunction barring his employer from excluding him from the classroom was
denied. While the presiding judge stated that he believed that the plaintiff could
ultimately win the case, he also stated that his own skepticism and uncertainty
regarding the current state o f medical knowledge with respect to AIDS resulted
in the denial of the plaintiffs plea to the court for relief. He wrote:
It seems to me the problem is that we simply do not know enough about
AIDS to be completely certain. ...and I do not in any sense mean to be an
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alarmist... I think if s too early to draw a definite conclusion ...about the
extent of the risk (Tumer 1988,3,3-4).
The judge further stated that there was a significant risk of transmission at some
point, because of the “almost inevitable mutation" of the virus (Turner 1988,
notes, 33,28). The district court further stated that the plaintiff had failed to
show that he had suffered irreparable injury (due to the fact that he had been
offered an adm inistrative position without loss of income or benefits), and that
the teacher's injury was ‘outweighed by the fear* likely to be produced in the
classroom.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court ruling. In regard to the
plaintiffs pleadings, the court ruled that the district court had failed to follow the
guidelines set forth in Section 504 and the those in Arline. While addressing
many of the issues in Arline, the district court had failed to follow the precedent
set in A rline and had improperly shifted the burden of proof (regarding apparent
risk) to the plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit stated that “little in science can be proved
with complete certainty, and Sec. 504 does not require such a test." It further
reasoned that the lower court had ‘im properly relied on speculation and had
rejected the overwhelm ing consensus of medical opinion' (Tumer 1988, 3, 4).
The appeals court decision was not without other case law to support the
issues in the classroom. During this time there were many cases that had
appeared on the court dockets that involved school children, afflicted with the
aids virus, being allowed to attend regular classroom instruction. The clear
difference between these cases and Chalk is not the science but the
jurisdiction. School children, specifically handicapped children, are covered
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under a separate piece o f legislation than was to be applied to the decision in
Chalk. This difference in jurisdiction did not matter to the court as the
assessment of the risk would be the same, teacher or student. "
The issues in the A rline and Chalk decisions confirmed that the issue of
AIDS would be covered in the language of Section 504, but the impact of AIDS
afflicted individuals participating in much of the benefits of society would not be
without its limitations. In the employment and education contexts, all casual
contact is ruled out as a contributing factor, and the ‘reasonable
accommodation’ language applied to all handicapped individuals. This would
not go without a rigorous test in other areas.
Even though the issues appeared clear regarding employment and school
attendance, other factors came into play when the issues came into the health
care area, in both the employment and education settings. While it has been a
creed of the health care practitioner to help, treat, and when possible cure the
disease ridden and injured patient, the AIDS afflicted individual raised a
concern among health care workers that was already sweeping the country.
While I will not attempt to argue for the AIDS patient in the context of patient
rights to adequate health care (as that is a subject for another forum), the
general ethical stand is that a ll patients have a right to receive treatment,
regardless of the nature o f their individual affliction. This treatm ent includes for
the patient the tenet of “keeping them from harm" in the course of their treatment
(Edwards and Graber 1988, 40).

Health care providers must address the

issue of AIDS affliction within their own ranks and assess the problems that this
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creates. The issue spans both the employment and education spectrums and
the issues are unfolding even as this thesis goes to print.
In the case of William Behringer, M.D. v. The M edical Center at Princeton
(1991), " a New Jersey court upheld a medical center's right to restrict surgical
privileges of an HIV positive physician. The way that this case developed and
the resulting decision regarding breach of confidentiality of information and a
disabled person's rights are important to the issues being raised. While the
issues of confidentiality are not central to this discussion, the resultant actions
are. William Behringer was a practicing surgeon at the Princeton Medical
Center who sought and received medical treatment for an undisclosed
condition. In the course of the treatment and inpatient stay at the medical
center, the physician was diagnosed as being HIV positive and through a lack
of structured policy regarding the confidentiality of such information, this
knowledge was communicated to the staff of the medical center. The issue may
not have been a problem for the average patient, but the fact that the patient
was a member of the medical staff led the court to determine that the hospital’s
confidentiality policy was insufficient to protect the rights of ALL patients. When
the information reached the president of the medical center, Mr. Dennis Doody,
he immediately suspended the physician’s surgical privileges by canceling all
pending surgeries planned by Dr. Behringer. W hile the doctor privately notified
the Chief of Surgery of his diagnosis, he stated that he wished to continue his
practice of surgery.
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The position taken by the surgeon in question and the then current (1987)
information from the public health agencies was placed before several
committees and was ultimately passed on to the Board of Trustees of the
medical center. The issues presented to the Board involved the facts that there
were no known cases of transmission of the HIV virus from infected providers to
patients, and that the public health agencies recommended that “Individualized
decisions” should be made regarding the continued practice of infected
providers. The Board concluded after examining all the issues presented and
assessing the ambiguity of the public health recommendations (that of stating
that “operating room precautions were expected to prevent HIV transmission”),
and the concerns of the hospital's president and legal departments regarding
the reputation of the medical center and the litigation possibilities due to the
public fear of AIDS (reasonable or not), that adopting a policy of requiring
patient informed consent would be the best course of action. The policy would
require that all patients preparing to undergo surgery by an HIV positive
surgeon, be informed, in writing, about this status. While adopting this policy for
the protection of the institution, all parties involved in the decision agreed that
“in the absence of patients willing to undergo invasive procedures by HIV
positive surgeons, this was a ‘de facto prohibition' from surgical practice”
(McIntyre 1991, 8).
Dr. Behringer sued for damages for tw o separate and distinct issues: 1) that
the hospital had failed in its duty to protect the confidentiality of patient
information and 2) that as a result of the subsequent policy conditions on his
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practice of surgery he was discrim inated against in a violation of the New
Jersey Law Against Discrim ination. ^ Dr. Behringer claimed that the medical
center’s breach of confidentiality of his HIV status had the result that “his ability
to practice was impaired, so significantly, that his medical practice was
damaged, if not destroyed”. The court found for the plaintiff in the argument of
confidentiality of inform ation and determined that the Medical Center was liable
for damages.
On the issue of the policy conditions regarding his right to practice surgery,
the court took a stand that has been a hallmark for health care providers who
perform invasive procedures. The court used many pieces of information in
formulating its decision. It was determined that surgeons (and dental
practitioners) frequently injure their fingers in the course of providing treatment.
“Most injuries are minor, but severe and unusual injuries sometimes do occur”
and surgical glove cuts and cuts to the fingers, while not common place, were
not unheard of (Keyes 1989,19).
This issue-whether or not AIDS afflicted health care providers or students in
the health sciences should be allowed to practice or train in the discipline-is a
problem that has been characterized as a “witch hunt” by some and a necessity
by others. The Center fo r Disease Control (hereinafter CDC) has specific
guidelines for the treatm ent of the AIDS afflicted patient and for the treatm ent of
the health care worker (hereinafter HCW) afflicted with the AIDS virus. The use
of “Universal Precautions” has been recommended against blood and other
body secretions by the use of gloves, masks, gowns, eye protection and other
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methods of ‘barrier protection’. Many of these have been used since the early
days of infection control, particularly in the surgical theater. These original
precautions were fo r the protection of the patient, most health care providers,
outside the operating room, merely used ‘good hand washing' as the best
defense against contracting disease from the patient. Routine patient contact
was considered casual contact and the skin provided adequate barrier from the
vast majority of patient conditions, with specific exceptions. From a patient care
standpoint, the CDC responded in 1985 with guidelines stressing the use of the
universal precautions with all patients with whom there is a chance of contact
with blood or other infectious body fluids. In other words, all patients are to be
considered infected until proven otherwise.
With regard to infected HCWs several studies, all of them retrospective In
nature, have been performed. Most of these have involved ‘look-back*
statistical examinations of the patients of AIDS afflicted surgeons. Without
going into the analysis of the data, much that has been concluded is that
“although a precise, quantifiable risk to patients (from undergoing surgical
procedures by AIDS infected health care workers) is not yet possible, the risk is
most likely quite low" (Barnes, et. al., 1990, 313).

Responding to the potential

for HCW to patient transmission the CDC guidelines in 1985 also stated:
[A] risk of transmission of (AIDS) infection from HCWs to patients
would exist in situations where there is both (1) a high degree
trauma to the patient that would provide a portal of entry for the
virus (e.g., during invasive p ro c^u re s) and (2) access of blood or
serous fluid from the infected HCW to the open tissue of the
patient, as would occur if the HCW sustained a needlestick or
scalpel injury during an invasive procedure. (CDC 1985) '®
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This determination of a potential risk to patients from HIV infected HCWs
performing invasive procedures was a profound statement considering that the
only clearly identified infectious risk to patients, and one that medicine has
diligently fought to minimize since the discovery in the early days of surgery,
was bacterial infection.
In the 1985 guidelines the CDC also stated that testing of HCWs performing
invasive procedures should be considered and there was no clear reason to
restrict HIV infected HCWs from performing non-invasive procedures “unless
they have evidence of other infection or illness for (which they) should be
restricted". This apparent restriction is to protect the HIV infected HCW as these
conditions are immunosuppressive in nature and the risk to the immune
suppressed HCW from ill and infectious (other than HIV) patients is increased.
This has been one of the m ajor complaints from HCWs regarding all of the
fervor regarding patient risk.
Medicine traditionally has been in the forefront in the battle to prevent the
patient from acquiring so called “in-house” infections. Aseptic technique is
religiously followed and the general consensus among HCWs is that real risk is
not to the patients but to the workers. While all of this may be true for the
patients- that the risk to the patient of not having the invasive procedure or of
expiring from the procedure itself (almost all invasive procedures of a surgical
nature carry a mortality risk of one form or another) is profoundly greater than
acquiring an infection from the HCW- this does not change the political wind
which often blows the way of public opinion.
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In Behringer, the plaintiff argued that “ the risk of transmission of HIV to [aj
patient is too remote...” (McIntyre 1991,8). Aside from this, the case still
remains that there is a ‘potential risk’ of transmission to the patient. The
American Medical Association (AMA) in response to the CDC issued its own
guidelines in 1988 for the employment of the HIV infected physician. The
guidelines are fraught with ambiguities. This is probably due to the fact that
there is no general agreement among physicians as to the real risk. But the
ethical message is clear. It states:
patients are entitled to expect that their physicians will not increase their
exposure to the risk of contracting an infectious disease, even
minimally... if a risk does exist, the physician should not engage in the
activity (JAMA 1988).
The AMA followed these guidelines in 1991 with an affirmation of this policy by
stating that:
...the “medical profession... should err on the side of protecting
patients” and that HIV infected physicians “have an ethical
obligation not to engage in any professional practice which has an
identifiable risk of transmission” to the patients (AMA 1991). ”
This “no identifiable risk” standard set forth by the AMA is not clearly thought
out and is not universally applied. A “no risk” standard is a standard that is not
attainable. At any one time all health care workers are infected either with
simple colds or other viral infections that will have little impact on a patient’s
health, or with infections or bacteria that are considered indigenous or normal to
the body. The standard sets even minimal or remote danger levels that may
disqualify all providers. This was never the intent of the AMA and the
enforcement of these guidelines and its ‘non-application’ of these standards
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(the stumbling block used is the debate over Hepatitis Infected providers) to the
aforementioned disabilities (as classed by Sec. 504) places the AIDS infection
at a h/gher standard than other disabilities. This may be inconsistent with the
amicus curiae brief submitted by the AMA and used in the Ariine decision. It
might also be inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause and may not satisfy the minimum scrutiny of a differential rational basis
test. If two groups are to be treated differently (infected vs. non-infected
providers), they must be truly dissimilar. "For the classification to be valid the
risk of transmission to the patient would have to be unacceptably high. If the
risk of contagion were inconsequential, the equal protection clause would not
permit differentiating between HIV-infected and non-HIV-infected providers"
(Keyes 1989, 16). Having established that the chance of transmission of the
disease from HOW to patient is possible, albeit remotely so (even rem otely
would be considered ‘unacceptably high’), the minimum scrutiny of rational
basis is satisfied. In the amicus brief the AMA used severity of risk, that of the
risk to third parties as one of the criteria for analysis. In this determination of
severity, with the potential for ultimate death of an individual from HIV infection,
if contracted, the potential for harm has clearly been established. W hile some
HOW and patient interaction will carry no greater risk than casual contact, those
who perform invasive procedures may pose a risk that is of consequence. The
COC defines invasive procedures as:
Surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair of major
traum atic injuries 1) in an operating or delivery room, emergency
department, or outpatient setting, including both physicians’ and
dentists’ offices; 2) cardiac catheterization and angiographic
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procedures; 3) a vaginal or cesarean delivery or other invasive
obstetric procedure during which bleeding may occur; or 4) the
manipulation, cutting, or removal of any oral or perioral tissues,
including tooth structure, during which bleeding occurs or the
potential for bleeding exists (COC 1987).
The focus must now shift to the "otherwise qualified" issue under the
Rehabilitation Act. In order to effectively assess "otherwise qualified” one must
weigh the risk posed against the benefit provided. "From the point of view of
risk, an HIV-positive provider threatens an interest upon which society and the
law place a high premium - life. Life-threatening behavior is unacceptable
whenever the risk out-weighs the benefit" (Keyes 1989,22). The concern is
raised about the best available surgeon to perform the procedure to maximize
the potential benefit, and is this particular practitioner otherwise qualified over
others to perform the procedure. One must use tort law to assess the risk
balanced against the utility.
(a)While society must protect the availability of vital services, there
is no need to protect the services of any one provider. Generally,
there will be many non-infected providers to replace those who
have been restricted from performing invasive procedures...
(b)restrictions due to HIV positivity will only interfere with the
provision of a very small fraction of the total... these services can
be adequately provided by non-infected practitioners... (c)[and] the
extent that such interest [eliminating the likelihood and severity of
harm] can be adequately advanced or protected by another, less
dangerous course of action (Keyes 1989,22). “
Much of the debate about AIDS afflicted individuals has involved public fear.
To combat this fear and to make clear law against the discrimination toward
these individuals, the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter ADA) was
enacted in 1990. “ Here the definition of the handicapped individual included
specific mention of the AIDS infected individual. While the substance of the
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definition was consistent with Sec. 504, the ADA served to remove all doubt
about the AIDS inclusion. While the Court’s decision in Ariine had defined
"significant risk" as the standard for persons with infectious diseases, the ADA
expanded the concept of the terminology with the use of the term "Direct
Threat". Title I, sec. 1630.2(r) states;
An employer may require, as a qualification standard, that an
individual not pose a direct threat to the health and safety of
himself/herself or others. If, however, an individual poses a direct
threat as a result of a disability, the employer must determine
whether a reasonable accommodation would elim inate the risk or
reduce it to an acceptable level. If no accommodation exists that
would either eliminate or reduce the risk, the employer may refuse
to hire an applicant or may discharge an employee who poses a
direct threat. The employer, however, is not permitted to deny
em ploym ent... merely because of a slightly increased risk. The
risk can only be considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e.,
high probability, of substantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is
insufficient (ADA 1990). **
The wording in the ADA seems to eliminate the possibility that a remote chance
of infection by an infected HCW to a patient would be criteria sufficient for the
imposition of the concept of ‘direct threat’.
The year after the enactment of the ADA and the same year as the decision
in Behringer, an orthopedic surgeon in Philadelphia filed suit under Title I and
Title III of the new law. In this case the issue of risk was again placed before the
courts after an HIV positive surgeon was placed under the same restrictions as
were used in Behringer. Dr. Doe was first suspended by the hospital and then
reinstated after the hospital’s medical staff concluded that Dr. Doe posed ‘no
significant risk’ to patients. The hospital board overruled the physicians and
applied a requirement of informed consent for all related patients as in
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Behringer. The doctor filed suit. In John Doe M.D. v. M ercy Health Corp.
(1993), the issue of direct threat v. a perceived threat was addressed. Scott
Burris, the attorney representing Dr. Doe, argued that the if risks of
complications, other infections as well as disclosure of surgical success are not
being disclosed to patients, then a different standard is being applied. This
would be in violation of the law according to Mr. Bum's (McCormack 1993, 1). “
Lawrence Gostin, executive director of the American Society of Law,
Medicine, and Ethics, worries that the courts are setting bad precedent in these
cases. The issues in Doe (and used in Behringei) regarding informed consent
are “a perversion of the doctrine” according to Gostin. "Recognizable risk not
remote risk" is the tenet of the doctrine of informed consent. “Either Dr. Doe is
dangerous and shouldn't be allowed to practice, or he is not dangerous and his
human rights should be respected”, says Gostin. “If the courts apply a different
standard to physicians with HIV than they do to other disabled people, it will
eviscerate the ADA", said Gostin (McCormack 1993,2). Gostin's point is that
the courts have, within the healthcare setting, applied the conditions of risk to a
higher standard. In Ariine and under Sec. 504, the standard was “significant
risk", where the ADA sought to end the subjective angle of this term inology and
implemented the concept of "direct threat”.
While much of the health care community remains divided on the potential for
cross infection of the HIV virus from provider to patient, the political realties and
the potential for accidental exposure in the course of a procedure remain. The
studies that have currently been completed ” still continue to show that the risk
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for acquiring HIV from an infected HCW are much less than the risk to the HCW
from the patient. They also show that, from an epidemiological perspective, that
the transmission potential is far less than for other infectious conditions (i.e..
Hepatitis B [HbV]) that have no such scrutiny and no such requirements.
Practicing health care providers are only part of the concern. What of the
aspiring surgeon, the graduate physician who is performing surgical residency
in order to become a full-fledged surgeon? Is there not a risk of those HIV
positive doctors "in-training”? Would the risk be increased, both occupational
for the physicians, and fo r the patient population? While much of the discussion
up until this point has focused on the applications of the various laws that have
followed the rights of the disabled regarding employment, the dialogue, or
dispute, must shift to the educational area. The employment issues are
governed under the ADA by Title I and are enforced by the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission (EEOC). Under the educational aspects the
regulations and the enforcement are different. For the purpose of this
discussion, we will concentrate on the public education area, not because an
argument cannot be made to include private education within the scenario, but
merely that the lines are more clearly drawn within the public sector and that the
private inclusion within these guidelines is not central to the issue at hand.
In addressing the educational issues regarding AIDS and the inclusion of
these individuals as disabled, there has been national discussion since Ryan
White’s m other first attempted enrollment of an openly HIV positive child in an
Indiana school district. W hile the Ryan W hite case made national headlines.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47
there were clear laws on the books to back up his claim to an education within a
traditional setting. In fact, the courts have had little sympathy with school
districts seeking to bar students from the classroom indiscriminately. Since
1975 the inclusion of handicapped children in regular classroom activities has
been the law. Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA),
children of school age could not be excluded from participation in regular
classroom activities due to a disability. ^ The act applies to children 5-18 years
of age and has some inclusion of young adults under age 21 involved in post
secondary education. The act states: "disabled children are to be integrated
into the regular [mainstream] school program, without creating significant risks
to students".
The act received vigorous testing in several cases and has also used Arfine
as a basis for much of the finding. In the case of M artinez v. School Board o f
Hillsborough County, a federal district court judge ordered the placing of seven
year old Eliana Martinez, a severely mentally handicapped child infected with
the AIDS virus, in a “glass cage", a specially constructed room within the regular
classroom {M artinez 1988). “

In vacating the district courts judgment in

Martinez, the Eleventh Circuit Court cited Ariine as the authority that only
"significant risks of transmission" will justify isolation. “Ariine is the leading
opinion on contagious disease under the Rehabilitation Act. As such it provides
guidelines for the treatment of AIDS issues in the public education setting"
(Jarvis 1991). * In the use of Ariine in making a determination in M artinez and
others, the courts created an intricate relationship between the EAHCA and
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Sect. 504. The thought would not be lost in the subsequent creation of the ADA
and the Title III issues relating to education.
Under the ADA many of the same issues raised in Martinez and Sect. 504
relating to "places of public accommodation" are applicable to Title III of the
ADA. Places of public accommodation under the ADA are numerous and
exhaustive, but schools are clearly listed under Title III-1.2000 (10) as "places of
education” (e.g., nursery schools, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or
post graduate private schools). ” As a result of the schools being considered
places of public accommodation, then individuals with disabilities may not be
denied "full and equal enjoyment of goods and services offered" by these
places (lil-3.1000). Under the ADA a person may not be discriminated against
or denied participation merely because of their disability (III-3.2000).
While the implication may be clear for participation in mainstream education
(by mainstream I mean regular classroom, didactic education, e.g., elementary
and secondary classroom education, and all classroom activities of a casual
contact nature), the ADA does not demand equality of achievement. The ADA
“does not guarantee that an individual with a disability must achieve an
identical result or level of achievement as persons without disabilities” (III3.3000). Therefore, although individuals with disabilities have the right to
actively participate, there are clear limitations as to what must be done from
both a reasonable accommodation standpoint and fundamental alteration of the
nature of the goods and services being offered. According to the ADA, a
fundamental alteration is "a modification that is so significant that it alters the
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essential nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations offered" (III-4.3600).
In light of these limitations, would an educator have to significantly alter or
adapt "academic standards” to accommodate the disabled individual? The
answer appears to be "no”, that this would be "unreasonable”. W hile a disabled
individual is guaranteed the right to participate, he is not guaranteed the right to
pass a particular course because of his disability. He must still meet all
essential academ ic performance standards, given that the attending institution
has made all reasonable accommodations (architectural, auxiliary aids, etc.) to
assure a disabled individual is afforded the opportunity to pass. But what of the
AIDS afflicted individual wishing to participate? In mainstream education the
answer appears clear. There is not a "significant risk” to prohibit participation as
it is determined that only casual contact exists in this classroom setting.
But this standard begs the all important question of "significant risk” in the
education of health care workers. The education process involves the potential
for failure and in many areas the failure process is just as essential as the
process for success. Overcoming failure is often the application of experience,
practical repetition and confidence, particularly in the training of performance
skills. Health care requires many skills that can only be learned through
intensive practical repetition and experience. In essence, one learns by doing.
One cannot learn to perform intravenous therapy out of a book. Unless one has
experienced the tactile feeling of a needle piercing actual tissue, one cannot
effectively learn the procedure-at least to the standard that one would be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50
allowed to actually perform the procedure on a real patient, whose very
existence may depend on the success or failure of the skill. All the practice on
all the rubt)er arms (a common educational tool for teaching the basics of the
intravenous therapy procedure) in the world will not satisfy nor substitute for the
requirement of living tissue in the educational process. One can learn the
procedure, but not the skill without living tissue.
As has been seen in the Behringer case and in Doe, the potential "direct
threat” to the patient has been established, regardless of the standard, but these
are cases that involve experienced professionals already possessing clinical
proficiency. But the issue of the health care student is unique, as no clinical
proficiency exists. If the standards applied in the previous cases are applied to
the student, the question arises, "can someone who is HIV positive earn a
medical, nursing, dental, paramedic or other health care degree that involves
‘invasive or exposure prone' procedures?”. Officials at The Medical College of
Georgia believe that "a student in training is more likely to injure him self while
providing treatment, and thus m ay pose a greater risk of transmission (of the
HIV virus) than an experienced practitioner” (Koelbl, 1991, 235).

There

appear to be no clear laws, other than the EAHCA, regarding these students
and the issue is left up to individual institutions for risk determination within the
clinical performance arena.
This chapter has extensively covered the various positions of disability law
as they pertain to the HIV positive healthcare provider. In examining the issue
of what it means to be considered ‘otherwise qualified’ and absent of direct
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threat’, the healthcare community has a problem with a statistical reality of
“identifiable" v. “potential” risk. As in the Sehnngrer argument, and subsequently
in Doe, plaintiffs argued from an ambiguous position regarding this risk. The
issues of student performance in the invasive area has been sidestepped by the
medical community, but obviously has ominous overtones.
With the inclusion of HIV in the status of “handicapped” , the laws have
become exhaustive as to their scope and protection. The formulation of these
laws, and the specific Congressional testimony regarding the contents for
inclusion will be examined in the next chapter titled, “The Framers".
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CHAPTER 4

THE FRAMERS
Where the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 fell short in the protection of the
disabled, the Americans with Disabilities Act attempted to take up the slack.
This chapter will probe into some of the specific testimony regarding the
formulation of this law. Experts in the field of public health argued for inclusion
of HIV infected individuals in their fight to curb a worldwide health problem. We
will examine the positions of the Justice Department regarding inclusion of
‘asymptomatic’ individuals, and the reasoning for that inclusion, based on
expected future court challenges that may arise and policy positions expressed
by the Surgeon General.
Implementation and jurisdiction over the Americans with Disabilities Act fell
to the U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare (later transferred to the
Department of Health and Human Services in 1980), which issues the
implementation regulations. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome falls under
the Act in the physiology of the immune system which is a part of the lymphatic
system. The Act’s covering definition will also include persons who test positive
for the virus but who have not presented with symptoms. The inclusion of
’asymptomatic’ individuals is a wide step away from the traditional
55
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understanding of what constitutes a disability and a clear expansion of the
established viewpoint. The courts soon resolved this very problem.
An essential reason for the act that is not mentioned in any of the specific
language of the law is the nation's approach to managing and mitigating or
controlling the epidemic of Human Immunodeficiency Virus. In the Senate
hearings, one of the key testimonies of the impact o f discrimination on the ability
of public health officials to fight and potentially track and control the epidemic
came from the Chairperson of the President’s Commission on the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic, Admiral James W atkins. Admiral Watkins
expressed to the committee the need for the inclusion of the AIDS afflicted
individual on a basis that had not been addressed in previous laws that
mandated inclusion. In Ariine and in Chalk, the issues had been about the
individuals in the cases and had involved the discrimination that had been
perpetrated against them. The cases had been precedent setting, but taking the
real step of arguing that inclusion of individuals with a contagious disease in an
anti-discrimination law would help to fight the epidemic, this was a new concept.
Admiral Watkins, in his prepared statement before the combined House and
Senate Committees, wrote, "HIV related discrimination is impairing this nation's
ability to limit the spread of the epidemic.... as long as discrimination
occurs....individuals who are infected with HIV will be reluctant to come forward
for testing, counseling, and care" (U.S. Congress, H o u se / Senate 1988,104). ’
In Watkin’s testimony before the joint committees he described the public
health problem:
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Crucial to this effort [to lim it the spread of the epidemic] are the
epidemiological studies to track the epidemic... . Public health officials will
not be able to gain the confidence and cooperation of infected individuals
or those at risk for infection if such individuals fear... discrimination based
on a positive HIV antibody test (U.S. Congress, House / Senate 1988, 104).*
The debate was far from over, and hearings on both sides of the capitol would
continue.
A year later, in committee hearings before a house sub-committee,
impassioned testimony was brought by the Rev. Scott Allen, Commissioner of
the National Commission on AIDS out of Washington, D C. Mr. Allen, in a
earlier statement before the same committee, agreed that, "all persons with
symptomatic or asymptomatic HIV infections should be clearly included as
persons with disabilities" and stated that "exclusion would be a tragic mistake".
He further argued "that subsequent acts of irrational discrimination that occur
[toward these individuals] has been one of the unfortunate landmarks of our
Nation's response to the HIV epidemic" (U.S. Congress, House 1989, 58). * In
his prepared statement presented to the committee, Mr. Allen stated, "people
living with AIDS and HIV infection, and those regarded as such, deserve the
same discrimination protections as all people with disabilities. Such protections
from discrimination are not only necessary to enhance the quality of life for
people, they are as the Presidential Commission and the Institute of Medicine
have reported, the linchpin of our nations effort to control the HIV epidemic"
(U.S. Congress, House 1989, 58). *
The issue then presented to the committee was one of public health battling
the epidemic, not just the acts of discrimination perpetrated against individuals.
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Here the actors involved have done what policy analysts call issue re-definition.
Baumgartner and Jones have argued, generally, that this type of re-definition is
an effort by the actors to expand the scope of conflict. Formerly, this issue had
been seen by the American public as a homosexual problem and a problem of
drug addicts, both undesirable components of the American population.
Several outspoken Christian ministers had even called the AIDS epidemic
“God’s revenge on the homosexual community". To re-define the issue as a
public health problem and not some moral evil is a tactic that solidified the
agenda placement of the issue of AIDS and HIV, and mandated inclusion in the
subsequent legislation. This mobilization caused the issue to be expanded
beyond the individual concerns that had been addressed in Ariine and Chalk
and made the public health problem a better focus to concentrate on. That did
not stop opponents to the inclusion from expressing their views but gave real
grounding as to the magnitude of the issues. This also allowed a partial
dismissal of the bias associated with the view of the issue being only a
homosexual o r drug abuse issue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). ^
In the form ulation of this new law Congress seemed to leave 'no stone
unturned" in its search for a policy that could survive the intense courtroom
dissection that may be in the offing. The legislature had countless hours of
hearings from m ultiple committees delving into the nature of disability rights and
issues of possible real and perceived discrimination.
In committee hearings in the House of Representatives, many persons
testified and presented material to assist the legislature in the policy formulation
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process. Congressman William E. Dannemeyer from California questioned
many individuals regarding the nature of the rights o f the disabled and those
proposed for inclusion in the ADA. Upon questioning Mr. Peter Addesso, a
wheelchair-bound representative of the Paralyzed Veterans of America, Mr.
Dannemeyer asked Mr. Addesso if "the proponents of this legislation... were
seeking to extend the coverage of the benefits of the protection that's desired...
for groups of people that the American public I'm not sure is willing to extend
that benefit for" (U.S. Congress, House 1989, 58). * Mr. Addesso replied,
"Personally, I feel that we shouldn't discriminate against anybody." Mr.
Dannemeyer continued, "What I am suggesting sir, is that I suspect that there
may be groups seeking the coverage of this act that go far beyond what
sensibilities and sympathies of the American public are willing to do in the way
of accommodations for persons who have suffered genuine disabilities' (U.S.
Congress, House 1989, 58). ^ The hearing testimony is not quoted in full; it was
interspersed with questions about AIDS and some o f the medical complications
associated with the disorder. The point of citing it is that, irrespective of all of the
court cases that had been litigated and judicial opinions handed down.
Congressional opposition to an inclusion of the AIDS afflicted individual and all
persons with communicable diseases was present. Further questioning later in
the committee session illustrates this fact.
Mr. Chai R. Feldblum, legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties
Union, was subjected to a series of questions by Mr. Dannemeyer. Mr.
Dannemeyer in the course of the 'interrogation', demanded 'yes' or 'no'
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answers to complex questions regarding inclusion of certain individuals in the
proposed legislation. Mr. Dannemeyer directly asked Mr. Feldblum, "if we strike
out the [inclusion] of persons with communicable diseases, would you still
support the act?". Mr. Feldblum replied, after an exhausting and futile attem pt to
explain some of the intricacies of the provisions within the act, with an emphatic,
"No" (U.S. Congress, House 1989, 58). * They further discussed the issue of
"direct threat* as addressed in the CRRA by the Humphrey-Hawkins amendment
as it applies to the ADA. Here Representative Dannemeyer showed clear
ignorance of the totality of the previous laws and previous actions by Congress
itself, with regards to the CRRA and section 504. Mr. Dannemeyer stated:
... there are opportunistic diseases present in persons with HIV....that are a
direct threat to co-workers. For this country to adopt a law that extends the
coverage of what this act seeks to do to persons in that class is a m ajor
policy step... [without any] idea of the implications of what this law seeks to
do.
Mr. Dannemeyer*s comments, on the face of it, appear uninformed and
biased. If one were to examine a possible policy process scenario, the principle
of charity might lead us to view them in a different light. Mr. Dannemeyer*s
comments appear to be seeking an alternative to a possible policy that he and
his constituents find distasteful. ’ Kingdon outlines the methods that policy
makers often rely on when faced with steps that they fear create too large a
change. "As policy makers consider the alternatives from which they will
choose, they repair to ideas and approaches with which they are fam iliar"
(Kingdon 1995, 82).
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Mr. Dannemeyer was clearly seeking an alternative to that portion of the
policy being debated that he finds to be too far reaching (its inclusion of the
homosexual and the drug addicted community) and inclusive of those
unfavorable groups. The ease with which it is possible to fall back on an
approach that is unfavorable to specific groups borders on bigotry and is a
slippery slope that the Congressman should have wanted to avoid. With his
specific exclusion of the homosexual and active drug abuse group members
from the disability category, the question of group discrim ination based on
membership is brought to the forefront. Yet, as he should have known, this is
exactly the type of discrim ination that has been outlawed in the Fair Housing Act
Amendments of 1988 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is this discrimination
that the ADA addresses in the provision of "those regarded as having the
disease" when the discrim ination is pun/eyed to an individual based on group
membership rather than on proof that the disability or disease actually exists.
Unfortunately for Mr. Dannemeyer, his comments in search of a reasonable
altemative to a policy he considered too broad and sweeping in its inclusive
nature, appear uneducated and antiquated. It is exactly this type of thinking that
the ADA and many of the discrimination laws are geared to fight. Mr.
Dannemeyer may have proved the point of the whole process in a backward
sort of way.
In the face of all the previous judicial and adm inistrative rulings that had
taken place prior to the start of the hearings for the ADA, it is not unreasonable
to expect the officials in the Congress and the various departments responsible
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for the drafting of the legislation to carefully examine the precedents. This is
what was done by the Justice Department in the form of a memorandum drafted
by then Acting Assistant Attorney General Douglas W. Kmiec. Mr. Kmiec, in the
memo for Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President, presented the
views of the Justice Department on the various court rulings and administrative
and Congressional amendments of the applicable laws.
Much of the ADA wording has been directly taken from section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, specifically the definition of what constitutes a
disabled individual and the areas of 'otherwise qualified' and reasonable
accommodation'. In the areas that had been less than w ell defined, the Justice
Department, by way of this memo, attempted to clarify the administration's
position regarding the inclusion of the symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV
afflicted individual.
The Supreme Ck)urt decision in A/ilne clearly identified the symptomatic
contagious disease carrier to be under the coverage of section 504. In fact the
issue in Ariine had not been the nature of the affliction that caused her the
problem and subsequent dism issal, but her risk of 'contamination' to her
students. The court ruled clearly that "the fact that a person with a record of
impairment is also contagious does not suffice to remove that person from
coverage under § 504. Contagiousness by itself, does not obviate the
existence of a handicap fo r purposes of section 504" (Department of Justice
1988). "
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Since the Issue o f contagiousness had been resolved to the satisfaction of
the Justice Department the issue of the asymptomatic individual, which had
been effectively dodged by the High Court, was an issue that had to be
addressed. Shortly after the decision in Ariine, then-Surgeon General 0.
Everett Koop informed the Justice Department, via letter, that the asymptomatic
HIV infected individual is physically impaired, stating that "from a purely
scientific perspective, persons with HIV infection are clearly impaired. They are
not comparable to an immune carrier of a contagious disease such as Hepatitis
B" (Department of Justice 1988). ’*
In response to Koop's letter the Justice Department made the following
recommendation. "In our view, the type of impairment described in the Surgeon
General's letter fits the Health and Human Services definition of "physical
impairment" because it is a "physiological disorder or condition" affecting the
"hemic and lymphatic" systems. We therefore believe that, in light of the
Surgeon General's medical assessment, asymptomatic HIV-infected
individuals, like their symptomatic counterparts, have a physical impairment"
(Department of Justice 1988)." This is the first part of the determination for the
status of ‘handicapped’. The second and possibly more important is the effect
on 'major life activities'. One could argue that the absence of any physical
symptoms precludes inclusion under this criterion.
The question with respect to asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals is
more difficult because such individuals would not appear at first glance to
have disabling physical effects from their infection that substantially affect
the type of life activities listed in the HHS regulation. ...Nevertheless, we
believe it is likely that the courts will conclude that asymptomatic HIV-
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infected individuals have an impairment that substantially limits certain
major life activities. ...This conclusion, we believe, may be based on the
effect that the knowledge of infection will have on the individual or the
effect that knowledge will have on others" (Department of Justice 1988).
This distinction is essential and Kmiec makes clear a differentiation that the list
in the CFR is not to be considered an 'exhaustive' one and was of the opinion
that at least some of the courts might see certain activities that might be affected
directly by the knowledge of HIV-infection or a positive te s t.
Perhaps the most important [of] such activities are procreation and
intimate personal relations. Based on the medical knowledge
available...the life activity of procreation ...is substantially limited for an
asymptomatic HIV-infected individual...[and] because of the infection...
they will be unable to fulfill this basic human desire" (Department of
Justice 1988). "
Kmiec continued a discussion of the 'intimate relations'. "The life activity of
engaging in sexual relations is threatened and probably substantially limited by
the contagiousness of the virus" (Department of Justice 1988). *
This outlines the Department's opinion on how the knowledge of the
presence of the infection affects the carrier. But how does the knowledge of the
infection affect the reactions of others? This will involve the section of the
definition of 'handicapped' which states that an "individual [may be] regarded as
having such an impairment" (CFR 1987). "
The problem with the "regarded as having an impairment" element of the
statute is that much of the issue involves one person's perception of another.
Due to continued prejudice against infected individuals and individuals who are
members of groups with an abnormally high risk for the infection, the need to
expand the definition to be inclusive of these individuals was apparent to the
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Justice Department. Reactions of others to the knowledge of the presence of an
HIV-infected individual have ranged from mild displeasure to outright hysteria.
Reference the Ryan W hite school attendance issue and the fam ily of three HIVinfected boys who were burned out of their home because of community fear
and ignorance. While these cases made national headlines and were
ultimately decided on issues other than disability law. community reaction is
often one based on an unfounded fear that has been used to discriminate
against individuals so afflicted (EAHCA, 1975). "
This reaction was not out of the scope of the Justice Department’s concern.
The decision in Arf/ne gave clear perspective that the handicapped definition
includes someone who is regarded by others as having a lim itation of major life
activities, whether they do or not. The literal reference is to actual infected
individuals who do not show any outward signs and not to the mis-perception of
disability based on prejudice. This literal interpretation is precisely the issue
that Representative Dannemeyer was addressing when questioning Mr.
Addesso. If an individual is being discriminated against because of a perceived
infection, does he fall under the protection of the ADA? Does this mean, as
Representative Dannemeyer asserted, that members of high risk groups m aybe
included under the handicapped criterion, if the 'perceived infection’ was the
reason for the discrimination? The answer appears to be 'yes’, even though
mere membership in a high risk group itself is not a cause for inclusion. This is
an issue that will ultimately be decided in the courtroom as no precedent exists
on this issue. The Supreme Court has stated that the coverage of §504 does
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include persons "who as a result [of being incorrectly regarded as handicapped]
are substantially lim ited in a major life activity" {Davis 442 US 397, 1979). "
T h e effect of this interpretation is that the perceived impairment need not
directly result in a lim itation of a major life activity, so long as it has the indirect
effect, due to the mis-perception of others, of limiting a life activity." That is, the
law must not sanction exclusion based on mis-perception.
In Ariine, the perception of a physical disability by others "does not have to
include the belief that the perceived condition results in a limitation of major life
activities, but sim ply that the perception of the condition by others in itself has
that effect" (Department of Justice 1988).*° It is clear (as clear as fog can be)
that this might be used as a possible argument if an individual, by virtue of
membership in a high risk group, were perceived to be infectious, thereby
having a major life activity limited, would be so covered under the provisions of
the ADA. There would have to be a clear case that the individual was not
claiming coverage as a member of the high risk group and had a prima facie
case of discrim ination based on the perception of others. The issue of the
discrimination against these individuals does not go without limitation. This was
addressed by the court in Ariine with the "otherwise qualified" wording, and in
the Humphrey / Harkin amendment of "direct threat" in the CRRA, later
incorporated into §504.
In the areas of "otherwise qualified" and "direct threat", the framers of the
legislation were careful to make allowances for the afflicted in the first case and
protection of others in the second. While the concept of "otherwise qualified"
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was used in the decision in Ariine and is a standard in the determination of the
qualifying of the disabled, it is often coupled with the "reasonable
accommodation" caveat that also accompanies "direct threat". Since the
wording in the laws, of both §504 and the ADA, remain unchanged with regards
to "otherwise qualified”, we will eliminate that wording from the discussion as
the framers saw no reason to change o r alter the treatment of this section.
Since the Harkin / Humphrey amendment to the CRRA (later incorporated into
§504), the concept of "direct threat" and "reasonable accommodation" were
included in the debates on capitol hill. In the Kmiec memo, the Justice
Department outlined the basic tenet of the "direct threat" component and
specifically addresses the AIDS issue.
[A] person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious
disease to others... will not be considered otherwise qualified ... if
reasonable accommodation will not eliminate the risk. Persons infected
with the AIDS virus will not be otherwise qualified to perform jobs that
involve significant risk of transmitting the virus to others (Department of
Justice 1988). ^
The risk of viral transmission can be obviated by making reasonable
accommodation to eliminate the risk, but the Justice Department, in the Kmiec
memo, stated there might be cases where there may be a justification for
treating the HIV-infected individual differently than non-infected individuals.
This appears to be done on a case by case basis with the determination of
'otherwise qualified' and ‘direct threat’ applied to each scenario. Persons found
otherwise qualified (in general) but unable to eliminate the direct threat to
others would be considered not ‘otherwise qualified’. The language is very
specific in this memo. Kmiec wrote:
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Courts may find in certain specialized contexts that an HIV-infected
individual is not otherwise qualified at any stage of the disease because
infection in itself presents an especially serious health or safety risk to
others because of the nature of the position (Department of Justice 1988).
The need to place the responsibility on a case by case basis was the
framer’s attempt to not violate any provision of the Acts themselves, but to also
subject the inquiry to the equal protection requirements in the 14th Amendment.
The Justice Department outlined several areas where an infected individual
may not be otherwise qualified. Depending on the stage of the disease, those
responsible for public safety such as air traffic controllers or pilots, policemen or
bus drivers, may not be covered. The outlined areas also specifically mention
surgeons in teaching hospitals that may have surgical privileges restricted or t)e
prohibited from performing invasive procedures. The Justice Department
specifically stated: "it may not be possible to make reasonable accommodation
... where the risk of injury is great".

Kmiec concludes the discussion with a re

statement of the provisions of §504 and the concept of direct threat.
The proponents of the ADA were seeking to codify existing laws as they
pertained to the handicapped. They were also seeking to further define and re
define existing language as it pertains to contagious disease and risk imposed
on the public by the existence of these diseases. The ADA could be called a
"garbage can” law. It involves so many existing laws and statutes that it really
seeks to pull all of the decisions into one area.
One of the big problems associated with the ADA is its far reaching
application that is left for the courts to sort out. The framers, in the drafting of the
act, clearly did not know what all of the implications may be, because the
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science related to these infectious conditions lags behind the public necessity
for action. Representative Dannemeyer, in his opposition to the amendment of
the CRRA may be entirely correct when he stated: "If this bill is passed, as
presently written, employers will be required to accommodate victim s of this
fatal disease despite potential health threats to other employees."

23

Realistically, the Congressman's comment is probably not in-step with the
science, but so much is still unknown about the virus that many are unwilling to
discount the possibility that he could be correct, and the nation has set itself up
for a major public health problem. The Congressman believes that the act is a
leap of faith that should not be made in haste.
The unique aspect found in this inquiry was the ability of the representatives
of the various agencies to transform the item from a homosexual and drug
abuse disease into a public health fighting tool. This issue re-definement is an
essential component of the act and Admiral Watkins’ testim ony before the joint
House and Senate committees is the most profound element discovered so far.
It is clearly plausible, as referenced in the Admiral’s comments and prepared
statement, that any discrimination against HIV-infected individuals would force
the virus, and those infected with it, to go underground. This would cause the
ability of the public health agencies to track, report, and fight the "unseen
enemy", to virtually disappear overnight.
This has been the case from the very beginning. The AIDS virus, due to its
deadly nature and method of transmission, has caused heightened concern
among the population. Those afflicted by the disease, whether symptomatic or
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asymptomatic, have been reluctant to seek treatment and counseling for fear of
societal reprisals and discrimination. This above-board treatment of the afflicted
individual, within the confines of the provisions of the ADA, can only seek to
relieve the burden of secrecy that has so plagued these individuals.
As we have examined in this chapter, exhaustive testimony and clarification
has been sought by the various framers o f this law. We have seen the
reluctance, by individuals and agencies, to place within the law any portion that
would extend disability protection to undeserving persons. We have also seen
the strength of the medical argument, as referenced by the comments of the
Surgeon General to the Justice Department for inclusion. Clear interpretation
by the Justice Department has also supported the exclusion of individuals who
have been determined to not be ‘otherwise qualified' because of their inability
to show they are absent of ‘direct threat*. Congressional testimony aside, the
re-definement of the issue into a public health crisis helped solidify the
circumscription of asymptomatic individuals afflicted with HIV within the confines
of disability law.
The following chapter will outline a plausible policy designed to address
concerns raised by the Framers of these complicated laws and to offer
alternatives to existing policy and procedures that are fair and just to all.
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CHAPTER 5

POUCY
In proposing any new policy for a stated problem, a clear and concise reason
must be given to justify the change. As the previous chapters have outlined, we
are faced with a continued public health issue that will not go away. The
previous chapters have shown the issues that have become problematic as a
result of current practices. This chapter will examine some of the flaws that
current practices and policies have allowed and will propose a plausible
alternative policy that is workable under current disability laws. The public
grows weary with continued protective legislation that ignores the concerns of
the general well-being in favor of select individuals and groups. Protection from
discrimination is very important and must never be ignored. But when the
protection, reasonable or not, infringes on the health and welfare of the
community as a whole, real common good and autonomy is lost.
Personal autonomy, privacy, and professional growth are central to the
philosophical, legal, ethical, and policy positions of professional associations
responding to the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. Current policies are
clear in many aspects but ambiguous in others. The apparent goal of the
associations is to outline a standard of conduct consistent with available
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scientific information and to offer their members a format of performsunce relative
to their patients, their practices, and themselves.
Professional associations have traditionally asserted that they are the best
guardians of their own affairs as no one else is capable of fairly judging elite
professionals other than their own peer groups. It is said that the general
public, and those outside the particular area of expertise, do not have enough
knowledge to fairly arbitrate that which they do not fully understand. This claim
has been asserted in many areas including medicine, law, and some of the
public sector including police agencies. While the "public lacks knowledge”
claim is effective in many areas, it has also been equated with "hiring the fox to
watch the hen house". Professional groups and associations have knowledge
and they have an inherent obligation to protect association members from harm,
real and perceived. This obligation cannot be taken lightly but it also can be
disguised to the general public by the use of scientific data, flowery verbiage,
and technical language designed to lose anyone but the most learned
professional colleague. Hence, public respect for self-governing professionals
can deteriorate.
This criticism of professional associations and their policy analysts may be
too strong and bordering on the unfair. We would like to believe that these
associations are aware of their moral obligation to act in the best interests of the
public at large. But the argument is designed to show that there may be some
flaws in the peer review process and that sometimes the process itself should
be questioned. Clear policy from professional associations would give their
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members guidelines on which to base their behavior and build public
confidence in a health care system which has been accused of being elitist and
unresponsive to public fears and concerns about safety. The issue is not
whether the public fears and concerns are justified, merely that the system has
been unresponsive to the public perception that the health care community has
placed the rights and needs of its members above those of the patients and the
public.
Professional associations, specifically the American Medical Association
(hereinafter AMA) and the American Dental Association have developed
policies and standards of conduct for their members that try to balance the
professional obligations of their memberships in performance against the rights
of their members to be treated as equal citizens relative to personal rights and
freedoms. This has been a difficult task. This delicate balance has come under
fire for not taking into consideration moral obligations of these professional
groups that are central to their own philosophical basis.
The AMA’s ethics policy. Principles of Medical Ethics (1980), guides its
members' ethical responsibilities. The policy states that physicians must
recognize their obligations, not only to the patients, but also to society at large.
It does not state that physicians must "keep their patients from harm" as stated in
the Hippocratic Oath, but speaks of medical competence, compassion, and
human dignity. Statements in defense of the 4th century,

bce

oath of

Hippocrates would be inappropriate as much has changed within the current
scope of medical practice and the relationship of physician and patient is
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dramatically different in the modern era. The principles of this ethics policy
outline acceptable actions for physicians. They are charged with honest
dealings with patients and colleagues, respect for patient rights, advancement
of scientific knowledge, making relevant information available to patients, and
using the talents of other health professionals when indicated (Mappes and
Zembaty 1986, 54-55). ' Basic medical ethics are essential for professional
conduct and it appears in the policy that obligations of the medical practitioner
are clear regarding patient rights. The controversy comes in the application of
the principles, the interpretation of the obligations, and the extent to which these
obligations are applicable.
On the issues of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and HIV infection,
professional associations have a problem relative to their members and their
professional conduct. On the one hand, physicians are charged with providing
care and minimizing risks, on the other hand they must respect the rights of their
own group as individuals. Since the identification of the HIV virus in 1985,
scientific information has been compiled about methods of transmission of the
virus from host to recipient. While the complete epidemiological profile for
transmission is not relevant to the discussion at hand, the blood to blood
transmission has implications for the medical community both as an
occupational risk for the healthcare worker (often abbreviated HCW) in dealing
with the infected patient, and as patient safety from the infected healthcare
worker. *
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The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has defined the risk of exposure for
patients to involve only invasive procedures {MMWR ^99^, 40 [No. RR-8], 1-9) ®
and that all other care of a non-invasive nature poses no risk of transmission of
HIV or HbV (Hepatitis B virus) to the patient. The term ‘invasive’ has proved
unworkable as it appears that only certain invasive procedures of a surgical and
dental nature have been implicated in transmission of HbV. These and other
invasive procedures have been redefined as "exposure-prone" and the CDC
states that "performance of exposure-prone procedures presents a recognized
risk of percutaneous injury to the HCW, and - if such an injury occurs - the
HCW's blood is likely to contact the patient's body cavity, subcutaneous tissues.
and/or mucous membranes" (JAMA August 14,1991, 774-775). * The CDC also
states that "HCWs who adhere to universal precautions pose a small risk for
transmitting HbV to patients". ® They further state that "HIV is transmitted much
less readily than HbV" {JAMA August 14, 1991, 771). They conclude:
Investigations of HIV and HbV transmission from HCWs to patients
indicate that, when the HCWs adhere to recommended infection-control
procedures (universal precautions), the risk of transm itting HbV from an
infected HCW to a patient is small, and the risk of transm itting HIV is likely to
be even sm aller {JAMA August 14,1991, 775). ®
While the CDC has defined the term ‘exposure-prone procedures',
identification of which procedures are exposure-prone was sidestepped. They
state that "exposure-prone procedures should be identified by
medical/surgical/dental organizations and institutions at which the procedures
are performed." They further state that there is "no basis for recommendations
to restrict the practice of HCWs infected with HIV or HbV who perform invasive
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procedures not identified as exposure-prone”. This policy stance by the CDC
places the weight of the problem directly on the professional organizations. The
CDC's reluctance to take a stand on which procedures should be deemed
exposure-prone placed the associations in a position such that may have far
reaching implications to their members. In the strongest position yet taken, the
CDC recommends that,
HCWs who are infected with HIV or HbV... should not perform exposureprone procedures unless they have sought counsel from an expert review
panel and have been advised under which circumstances, if any, they may
continue to perform these procedures.... Such circumstances would include
notifying prospective patients of the HCW’s seropositivity before undergoing
exposure-prone procedures {JAMA August 14, 1991, 775).
The CDC also states that if professional practices of infected HCWs are
modified or restricted, appropriate retraining and career counseling should be
encouraged to promote continued use of the H C W s skills. This policy position,
while workable in theory, has not been feasible in the practical sense. In the
Behringer court case, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld an institution's
right to restrict surgical privileges of an HIV infected surgeon by requiring the
surgeon to get informed consent from patients about his seropositivity prior to
surgery. ® This would seem consistent with the CDC recommendations but may
conflict with subsequent legislation regarding disability rights as outlined in the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the term Direct Threat’ (Americans with
Disabilities Act [ADA], 1990).
The determination of risk and what constitutes identifiable risk, significant
risk, and acceptable risk, has not gone without debate, both in medicine and
business. Deborah A. Stone, in her work Policy Paradox and Political Reason. ®
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discusses the concept o f security. "In many current policy debates, people are
said to have needs based on the condition of 'being at risk’.” This risk is for a
"potential harm" or harm that has not yet happened and exists only in the future.
She states that "future needs often have a political potency far greater than
actual needs.” She further argues that the human imagination is capable of
creating strong emotional terror and fervent arguments seeking protection and
safety even in the face o f statistics that do not support the needs (Stone 1988,
77). Stone also determines that risk is calculated if the potential harms are
predictable and that the "probabilistic association of harmful outcomes with
human actions is widely accepted as a demonstration of cause-and effect
relationship” (Stone 1988, 156).
In other words, real predictable harm such as the death of a patient during or
after surgery, even for events that may have no statistical basis on an individual
case, may constitute an identifiable risk. These identifiable risks are exactly the
type of risks that are disclosed to patients and discussed with them prior to the
commencement of any surgery. While the risks are different for each and every
procedure, all procedures carry some amount of risk that the physician
discusses with the patient. This is called informed consent. Here the physician
informs the patient of the identifiable risks and tries to balance them against the
rewards that the necessary (or elective as the case may be) procedure will
provide. In many cases the risks are deemed negligible, or if real and possible,
may not involve a real risk of patient demise. Some risks may be real and
patient survival may be at stake and these can be either side of the spectrum.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright o w n er. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80
having or not having the procedure. Regardless of the extent of the probability,
or on which side of the position one stands, it is the patient that must ultimately
make the decision to accept the risks and have the procedure performed, or to
not accept the risks and choose a different provider, or live or die with the
consequences. In all instances a prudent person will seek to reduce his risk of
mortality while achieving the maximum benefit available. We wear seat belts to
reduce risk, we look both ways before crossing the street, we comply with
prescribed medications to get healthy and reduce m ortality. All constitute our
ability to reduce risk by prudent and calculated actions. We are, or try to be,
fully informed of the consequences of inaction and take steps to avoid exposure
and thereby diminish risk.
On the subject of risk, the AMA has adopted a set of terms that are used
within their membership and in their association policies. In response to the
HIV and HbV transmission concerns of the patient population, the AMA has
replaced the term 'identifiable risk" with that of 'significant risk* and states that "a
risk is significant if it is real and would change the actions of a reasonable
person." "There must be demonstrated risk of transmission, along with some
impact on decisions from knowledge of transmission probability, to meet the
standard of 'significant risk'" (AMA 1992, 91). " Due to a lack of documented
cases of transmission from physician to patient at this time, the AMA states that
this "transmission cannot, in general, be said to present a significant risk." This
is somewhat clear in what the CDC has stated earlier that the risk is lower than
HbV transmission, but nowhere do any of the associations say that the risk is
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zero or statistically zero. In the transmission statistics for HbV. studying multiple
patient infection groups, even with modification of the practiced universal
precautions (i.e.. double gloves, restriction of high risk procedures), certain HbV
transmissions still occurred even though they were limited in scope. The CDC
states, "however, the limited num ber of recent reports does not preclude the
occurrence... of transmission [and] routine use of gloves does not prevent most
injuries caused by sharp instrum ents and does not elim inate the potential for
exposure of a patient to a H C W s blood and transmission of HbV” {JAMA August
14,1991, 774, quoting the CDC). This assertion is that the risk of transmission
of HbV cannot be eliminated by routine universal precautions and modified
precautions.

Then by using the CDC’s 'small risk* term inology for HbV and the

'much less' (than HbV) term fo r HIV, indicates that the ambiguous language
makes the scientific information currently available indeterm inate at best.
The AMA offers this statem ent on transmission and patient rights In their
policy compendium;
Physicians, other health care providers and patients m ust recognize their
personal responsibility to prevent transmission of HIV disease in all
situations.... When the scientific data are unclear, it is mandatory that the
rights of the patient take precedence over those of the physician. In all
instances, physicians strive to "do no harm" to patients (AMA 1992, 91).
AMA policies do not identify which procedures are exposure-prone. Neither
does the American Dental Association. In one assertion the AMA states that the
risk of HIV transmission is immeasurably low (transmission risk as determined
by the American Dental Association is listed as "infinitesim al"), and much less
than HbV, yet in policy they call for voluntary compliance for seropositivity
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determination and offer a policy fo r monitoring of HIV-infected physicians
(American Dental Association 1991, 21). The policy offers two reasons for
monitoring: First, "to control the use of procedures with a significant risk of HIV
transmission to patients* and second, to "maintain a high standard of practice of
infection control". They further state:
Any HIV-infected physician should disclose his/her serostatus to a local
review committee. ...This review committee may restrict the physician’s
practice, if they believe there is a significant risk to patients’ welfare. One
such restriction may be the disclosure of physician seropositivity to
patients and obtaining consent prior to a procedure deemed to pose a
significant risk (AMA 1992, 94).
This statem ent, in light of the previous assertions that the risk o f HIV
transmission was remote at best, appear to be a contradiction in the
association's policies. Either there is a significant risk of transmission during
certain procedures or there is not. They do state within the policy that "this risk
is only theoretical in that no such transmission has so far been documented",
but this statement does not relieve the contradiction. The contradiction is not
present in the Current Policies of the American Dental Association. The dental
community has long advocated universal precautions for the prevention of
disease transmission and address the issue of HIV positive practitioners. They
state:
HIV infection alone does not justify the limiting of professional duties, or
automatically mandate disclosure, unless the dental health care worker
poses a risk of transmitting infection through non-compliance with
universal precautions, [or] a lack of infection control competence...
(American Dental Association 1991, 21).

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

83
The American Dental Association also advocates peer review for compliance
with the listed items and also recommends voluntary compliance with
seropositivity determination, but the policy, on the face of i t , appears consistent.
The whole problem with the risk management policies of the professional
associations is that we are forced to choose which course of action is
acceptable; either one that uses such vague terms as "infinitésimal" and
"remote at best" to describe the risk of transmission; or one that will side with
caution, prudence, and the public interest. "Errors are inevitable in such cases,
and contemporary philosophy of logic and applied mathematics has no
alternative available to a conscientious person under these conditions. The
uncertainty cannot be hidden or ignored, one of (the) two kinds of errors will be
committed" (Walton 1998). "
Dr. Craig Walton, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Institute for
Ethics and Policy Studies at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, argued in a
recent paper the dangers of the DoE proposal on deep geological burial of
high-level at Yucca Mountain, NV, that there are two types of uncertainty
calculi: Type I (scientifically conservative) and Type II (morally conservative)
errors. Dr. Walton states:
Type I errors involve saying, in effect, “if we must admit some errors into our
scientific base, let us prefer to reject a true hypothesis not yet actually
confirmed [here, that there is some risk to patients with HIV positive HCWs
performing ‘exposure prone' procedures], rather than accept a false
hypothesis, not yet actually falsified" [that the risk is not relevant because no
patients have been infected]. (Walton 1998).
Here the physician community would have us accept that it is better science to
allow infected providers to continue to practice because the patients have "not
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yet" been infected, rather than eliminate the risk because it is only “remotely”
possible. Walton continues concerning Type II errors:
Type II errors, by contrast, involve saying, in effect: if we must admit some
errors into our science, let us prefer to include an hypothesis not yet
confirmed, because of the meaning it has for public health and safety,
rather than excluding it because we are not able to prove a high likelihood
that it will in fact happen" (Walton 1998).
What Dr. Walton is saying is that we should never take a policy position based
on something that is possibly false (but not yet falsified) in the face of something
that is possibly true (but not corroborated). Walton sums it up best when he
stated:
Type II logic is chosen when the public health and safety is at risk...if error
is likely... than we err on the side o f caution rather than... saying, “that
danger has not been proven to be highly likely, so we can ignore it".
(Walton 1998).
When the issues of risk management deal with a given amount of uncertainty
and probability cannot establish clear parameters upon which to base policy
decisions; then prudence of action is the best response. Since we must choose
one of these two approaches (Type I or Type II) it is the latter that offers the most
cautious and prudent course of action.
The question now arises, "is the public willing to accept these risks or
increase in risk, or not?" If we are unable to accept this increase in risk and
prefer to mandate patient rights and full disclosure in the format of informed
consent, what is the impact on the polis as a whole? If we mandate patient
rights over that of the disabled individual, do we impinge on the rights of the
infected person?
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The problems of identifying select members o f groups as outlined in
association policies without taking a discrim inatory stance are challenging at
best, but from a solution standpoint they appear defensible. Handicapped
regulations as outlined in the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 do not permit this dissimilar treatment if the person can show that they are
"otherwise qualified*. There are several criteria used to satisfy the "otherwise
qualified* standing but if the afflicted individual cannot get past the concept of
"direct threat" then they cannot prove that they are otherwise qualified. The
ADA expanded the concept of the terminology; which states:
An employer may require, as a qualification standard, that an individual not
pose a direct threat to the health and safety o f himself/herself or others. If,
however, an individual poses a direct threat as a result of a disability, the
employer must determine whether a reasonable accommodation would
eliminate the risk or reduce it to an acceptable level. If no accommodation
exists that would either eliminate or reduce the risk, the employer may
refuse to hire an applicant or may discharge an employee who poses a
direct threat. The employer, however, is not perm itted to deny employment
... merely because of a slightly increased risk. The risk can only be
considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e., high probability, of
substantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is insufficient (ADA 1990).
The wording In the ADA seems to eliminate the possibility that a remote
chance of infection by an infected HCW to a patient would be criteria enough for
the imposition of the concept of ‘direct threat’. Court cases such as Behringer
and Doe seem to prove, or least affirm, that the concept of direct threat would
include surgical intervention. On the issue of the policy conditions regarding
the plaintiffs right to practice surgery the Behringer Court took a stand that has
been a hallmark for the position on health care providers who perform
exposure-prone procedures. The Court used m any pieces of information in
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formulating its decision. It was determined that surgeons (and dental
practitioners) frequently injure their fingers in the course of providing treatment.
“Most injuries are minor, but severe and unusual injuries sometimes do occur"
and surgical glove cuts and cuts to the fingers, while not commonplace, were
not unheard of (Keyes 1989,19).

In fact, these events do appear to be

commonplace. In a three month study at a Connecticut hospital of operating
room personnel cataloguing breaks in infection control procedures and
universal precautions, there were a reported 331 instances. O f these 331, 70
(21%) were from sharp injuries that caused direct pain to the individual.

We

must remember that these statistics are from a single hospital and only over a
three month period. Even with the principle of charity and the assumption that
they 'had a bad three months', the significance cannot be overstated. If we
were to reduce the numbers by 90%, taken against the whole of the nation, in
ALL of the hospitals and operating rooms (and these were only statistics
generated within the surgical environment, not including other areas that may
have some invasive performances, i.e. emergency rooms) the numbers are at
least significant and alarming at the worst (Wright, et. al. 1991 ).
Norman Daniels, a philosophy professor at Tufts University, argues that the
benefits of identifying and subsequently removing or restricting the practices of
infected providers will in no way justify the costs involved. Dr. Daniels, in what
appears to be a standard cost-benefit analysis, argues that the costs are not
only monetary but societal as well. The cost of 'switching* or the act of changing
practitioners due to HIV status affords a cost that is prohibitively high for all. The
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switching creates the need to identify the afflicted individuals when the costs of
the identification are prohibitive from a monetary standpoint at best. This
causes money that may have been better spent elsewhere (i.e. education,
improving compliance with infection control measures, research, and
monitoring) to be allocated to the discovery of infected practitioners. This is a
long term cost that Daniels says we should be unwilling to pay as the costs do
not outweigh the benefits (Daniels 1992, 1368-1371).

Daniels also states that

the costs would also be reflected in an increase in the discrimination against
AIDS patients because of the occupational risk inherent to HCWs. If physicians
were to face loss of their livelihood because of occupational seropositivity, they
would be less likely to want to treat AIDS afflicted patients.
Daniels makes an excellent argument in support of this concept and this
occupational risk alone is worthy of debate. His concept of using a statistical
analysis for surgical proficiency as opposed to seropositivity (designed to
eliminate the less skilled surgeon based on mortality and surgical success) is
also valuable.
But overall, I disagree and I think Daniels refutes his own argument when
he discusses the costs of fear. Dr. Daniels wants to keep the discussion within
a framework that is purely objective in nature and to dismiss the subjective
concepts of patient rights on a limited scale. "It is only because employers or
other workers try to hide behind their subjective views of risk in order to deny
equality of opportunity to handicapped workers that we must insist on objective
assessments of risk* (Daniels 1992,1370).
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Fear and stress are recognized problems within the medical community,
often cited as causing patient illness and exacerbating existing conditions. A
patient switching from an infected surgeon to a non-infected one may achieve
no measurable benefit except to alleviate his or her own fear. This fear may be
exaggerated by prejudice and stigma, but the costs of living with this fear may
be more than the switching. It may be a rational risk-benefit analysis that the
patient has examined, even when we tend to ignore com parable risks in other
contexts (Daniels 1992, 1389). I think that Dr. Daniels also neglects, when
discussing risk, that in any situation where mortality exists I w ill seek to reduce
my risk by contemplating alternative actions. I reduce my risk in the automobile
by wearing a seat belt. I wear a helmet when bicycling. If, in any situation, I can
reduce my mortality, even only fractionally, then through the process of
deliberation, I can reduce my risk, or choose not to. The resultant amount of
tolerated risk then becomes a personal choice and is not based on a statistical
analysis. The resultant costs of fear become the price that we are not willing to
pay.
It is difficult to take a position that appears discriminatory, alarmist, and
paranoid. It is also difficult to argue against the scientific information and
statistics that seek to prove that the “real risks” of infection transmission are
extremely low. Above these issues, there appears to be universal agreement
that research efforts and money should be allocated to increase the ability of the
medical community to combat infection transmission from an occupational
exposure, and I agree. This can help, not only from the occupational end but
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also from the patient protection angle. The medical community must also
explore the possibility o f re-inventing some of the accepted surgical techniques
to relieve the surgeon’s risk from being too close to instruments that may cause
percutaneous injury to the surgeon. Until that becomes a readily acceptable
alternative, exposure-prone procedures will not diminish in risk and the need for
further actions will be indispensable.
Immediate action is necessary to restore public confidence. The medical
community m ust collaborate, debate, and decide which procedures are
'exposure-prone'. W ithout the medical and professional associations
participation the legislators can have no clear framework from which to proceed.
In the absence of a definition of ‘exposure prone', the less accurate term of
‘invasive procedures' should be employed and the legislative branches should
act to enforce m andatory testing. Alternatively, if the medical community can
identify exposure prone procedures, then only those physicians who wish to
participate in these procedures will need to be monitored. Monitoring tactics
should include HIV seronegativity results to be submitted with license
renewals.’* This should be monitored on the national level, preferably by the
CDC, and a central data base should be compiled. The CDC is the natural
choice since they already track the virus. This would eliminate the problems
with state to state reciprocity and repetitive efforts of tracking and testing.
Complete participation by the medical professional is the only way we can
assure fair treatm ent fo r all parties concerned.
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While one might object that submission with license renewal will not identify
all infected individuals due to the serologic time window for infection to become
identifiable on lab results, I counter with the positive results of elimination of
currently infected individuals, proactive self-monitoring by the surgical
community, and ultimate catch-up with the séroconversions that happen in the
interim.
Another objection m ight accuse me of taking a stance that is truly
discriminatory against defined handicapped individuals, - which would be
against the law. As I have shown by the application of common law (as in
Behringer), however, these individuals cannot show they are otherwise
qualified’ and absent of ‘direct threat’. If they are not otherwise qualified’, it is
not discrimination.
I also argue that my approach, while dependent on the action of the
professional associations, is not in and of itself discriminatory. I do not argue
mandatory testing. A physician only has to submit lab results if wishing to
perform exposure-prone procedures. Those who do not wish to submit results
may move into areas of clinical practice that do not involve these procedures,
thereby avoiding dim inishing their ability to earn a living. Those who submit lab
results that are positive and still seek to participate in these procedures will be
mandated to obtain informed consent from their patients. Disability insurance
and other monetary protections for physicians that seroconvert from
occupational hazard should be afforded to all those practicing in the operating
theater, as the occupational hazards are real and should not be understated.
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As the physician community continues to argue for increased protections
from occupational exposure, an additional possibility could be offered.
As more and more seropositivity from the surgical community comes to the
forefront, a 'bank* of HIV seropositive surgeons may be created to achieve a
decrease in occupational exposure fo r the non-infected. When circumstances
and time allows, the ‘AIDS surgeon* could be brought in to perform exposureprone procedures on patients that are identified as HIV positive. With growing
numbers of the general population becoming HIV seropositive, this may be a
long term solution that may help relieve some of the occupational concerns.
These ‘banks’ could be regionally located so access to the patients would not
be inordinately delayed.
An objection might be raised that this approach further “isolates" the disabled
and HIV positive community. This is not my intent. I argue for the concept of
AIDS surgeons’ from a purely practical and protective angle. If HIV positive
surgeons can assist their colleagues and reduce the risks of further
seropositivity from occupational exposures by performing the exposure prone
procedures, then the general risk of further infection has been diminished. The
goal of any public health pandemic program is to stop the spread of infection.
This objective can only further help to stem the tide of an overwhelming
situation.
This entire policy position should also be recognized as not being limited in
scope. The entire argument may be further expanded to include other health
care practitioners involved in ‘exposure prone’ procedures such as surgical
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technicians and operating room nurses. It is also not limited by the specific viral
agent. It may be expanded to include those individuals that are HbV positive as
well, since HbV has been clearly shown to be more virulent than HIV. The
medical community has traditionally taken the leadership role in matters of
patient autonomy, safety, and public education. An active, positive approach
from the scientific community, seeking alternatives that are workable and clearly
definable is needed, now.
The moral defense for the aforementioned policy w ill follow in the next two
chapters. The ethical conduct and responsibility of these healthcare
practitioners is central to the justification for making a change. When the
statistical relevance of the scientific information has been brought into question,
the ethical platform is much firm er ground upon which to stand.
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CHAPTER 6

Communitarian Justification
The concept o f a community of people, banded together to enforce rights and
obligations, is not a contemporary theme. Aristotle, in the first line of his work
The Politics. ’ states that: “Every state is a community of some kind, and every
community is established with a view to some good; for everyone always acts in
order to obtain that which they think is good" (POL. 1252 a I -1254). This
chapter shall discuss the issues of the greater community and its good
balanced against the individual needs that may arise within it. We will discuss
individual responsibility as related to the community as a whole and the rights of
that community regarding its members and their responsibilities.
The sense of community is what binds people together in search of the
common good based on their views of what that good may be. It is a principle
ascribing to all humankind a vested interest in one another’s moral, intellectual,
and even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant according to his or
her own standards (Feinberg 1986, 215). ' Hobbes discusses the concept of
community, or to use Hobbes’s term, commonwealth, at great length in
Leviathan. = As a result of man's formation of the commonwealth, the power
behind the individual in the enforcement of the natural rights and civil rights (the
covenants, or agreements among men) are made possible. The defense of the
95

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

96
natural rights is easier in a group. When a man is attacked and his life is in
jeopardy, is it not easier to defend one’s life with the help o f others? People
bind together in commonwealths for "the foresight of their own preservation", the
protection of their most basic natural right, that of life itself (Hobbes 1651, 17,
109). ' The commonwealth is said to exist when a multitude of men “agree and
covenant, everyone with every one,... to live peaceably amongst themselves,
and be protected against [the intrusion or attack of] other men” (Hobbes 1651,
18, 113).
Mutual agreement was also a concept of Rousseau's. As Abraham Edel
quotes Rousseau, in his 1762 work. Social Contract, “the undertakings which
bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and
their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work fo r others without
working for ourselves" (Edel, Flower, and O’Connor 1989, 280). " Edel also
quotes Thomas Paine who stated, in Rights o f Man (1789), that ‘civil rights' are
those that are deposited within a common stock of the society of which he is an
equal proprietor. The power of the civil right is made up of an aggregate of the
natural rights that he has shared with the other members of the community
(Edel, Flower, and O’Connor 1989, 280). The power of the individual, with
respect to those shared natural rights, along with the added power of the civil
rights, are based in what has come to be known as Law.
As a result of the form ation of the commonwealth certain rules must be
established for the conduct of its members. These are what civil laws are all
about. Law, as outlined by Locke, “is the standard of right and wrong, and the
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common measure to decide all controversies between them ” (Locke 1690,
§124). Locke professes that given the human predisposition to look out for
oneself and to violate the rights of others, it was necessary to set civil
governments to enforce the social contract of civilized society. This is a society
of free individuals assenting to a collective will and all m ust live within the
boundaries as set up by the civil government. This is the agreement given by
individuals for the privilege of living in the society. Laws are also part of the
social contract agreed to by people and among persons within the community in
which they reside for the extension of the common good. Hobbes broadens the
definition slightly when he says.
Civil Law is to every subject, those rules, which the commonwealth hath
commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to
make use of, for the distinction of right, and wrong; that is to say, of what is
contrary, and what is not contrary to the rule (Hobbes 1651, 16).
While the overall general issue of community may be of some significance,
the issue of what are the requirements for the individuals within that community
must be grounded in responsibility or obligations. This organized conduct with
a view toward the ‘common good' is what the concept of community is all about.
Rights and obligations then are not conditions limiting the common good, but
conditions of the varying situations of the intermingled relations of persons
within their community (Hobhouse 1965, 43). * Rights talk is also mandatory
performance and brings up connotations of enforcement as well as of voluntary
compliance.
Responsibilities, on the opposing side, seem grounded in a voice of
accountability and encouragement. These two positions each offer a different
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perspective on individual performance within a community atmosphere. One
says, "I have rights that you must respect,” while the other speaks of “the good
that would be achieved by your thoughtful consideration of others in the
community”. One is a coercive or demanding tone, while the other has a
persuasive and reciprocating tone. A side effect of the rights / responsibilities
discussion is the way the person who is the objective focus of the discussion
will respond. If the person is compelled to act they may become embittered,
whereas a person that is persuaded to fulfill a responsibility, may make the
actor view the response to the higher impulse, a more noble action (Etzioni
1995, 41). ^ Am itai Etzioni, in his conscription of communitarian values states
that:
The exclusive pursuit of one's own self-interest is not even a good
prescription for conduct in the marketplace: for no social, political, or moral
order can survive that way. Some measure of caring, sharing, and being
our brother's and sister's keeper is essential if we are not all to fall back on
an ever more expansive government, bureaucratized welfare agencies, and
swollen regulations, police, courts, and jails (Etzioni 1995, 16).
The concept of community must also be viewed as an entity in itself. If we
are to believe in the concept of community then the rights and obligations of that
entity must be allowed to exist. “The community itself may be said to have
rights, that is just claims upon its members and all of its constituent elements”
(Hobhouse 1965, 41). It has been critically stated that the Communitarian
Philosophy insists that “rights have to be balanced by responsibility, [and] that
they seem m ore interested in the responsibility of the community as a whole- ‘its
responsibility*, say to the least fortunate members, than in the responsibility of
individuals” (Etzioni 1995, 65). This criticism is of no value as the
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communitarian, while committed to individual self worth and respect, serves a
higher group responsibility that is created by individual actions. A more realistic
approach is that modem society, as a result of the rights onslaught, has created
a paradox. This situation calls attention to the fact that “as a community we may
care more about the suffering of a few persons whose fate we confront directly
than about the many thousands for whom we may be more distantly
responsible” (Etzioni 1998, 114). ■
The issues related to the public health are also a part of the communitarian
philosophy. Etzioni best sums it up when he states:
When it comes to public health, people who carry [blood borne transmitted]
diseases, especially when the illness is always fatal, such as AIDS, should
be expected to disclose their illness ... and to inform all health care
personnel with whom they come in contact. It is their contribution to help
stem the epidemic (Etzioni 1995, 21).
The health care worker must also be responsible to the community at large,
not to place them at risk, to assist in the fight of a communal public health
epidemic, and to assure the safest possible health care environment.
Since the AMA policy statement that “physicians who are HIV infected should
refrain from performing exposure prone procedures”, physicians that are NOT
responsive to the policy could be said to be in violation of their ‘responsibility’
as both physicians and members of the community. This objective
determination o f responsibility, based on the AMA conscription o f “refraining
from performing exposure prone procedures”, is anchored in a community
value. When the “physician community” feels that the best course of action is a
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policy of restraint of individuals, than the general community m ay wish to affirm
the obligation. Etzioni states:
This is not primarily a legal matter. On the contrary, when a community
reaches the point at which responsibilities are largely enforced by the
powers of the state, it is in deep moral crisis. If communities are to
function well, most members most of the time must discharge their
responsibilities because they are committed to do so, not because they
fear lawsuits, penalties, or jails. Nevertheless, the state and its agencies
must take care not to harm the structures of civil society on which we all
depend. Social environments, like natural environments, cannot be taken
for granted (Etzioni 1995, 22).
It is the community's responsibility to its members that will be the foundation for
the assertion of the previous policy chapter. “Responsive communities define
what is expected of people...and it is communities that introduce and sustain
these commitments (Etzioni 1995, 22). It will fall to the individual members of
the community to respect the individual needs for privacy, confidentiality, and
autonomy as well as to assure that the duties and obligations of the individual
member are articulated by the community. The duty of the individual physician,
HIV infected or not, is to assure that inadvertent transmission of the disease
does not occur to unknowing individuals. In this same vein, Bayer and Toomey
discuss the professional ethic:
From the perspective of the ethics of the clinical relationship, those who
may have been placed at risk unknowingly have a moral right to such
information. The moral claim of those who have unknowingly been
placed at risk entails the correlative moral duty of the clinician to ensure
that the unsuspecting party is informed (Etzioni 1995, 84).
Physicians have a duty to the community. Duty to the medical community
consists in stemming an out-of-control public health epidemic by assistance, at
every tum of the wheel, to curb the AIDS epidemic. Duty to the community at
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large is to not place the public at a risk of infection that could be avoided,
despite the assessment of risk potential. In the absence of the above, the
general public must be allowed to choose who will, or will not, place them at
risk. It is the physician's obligation to the community. It is a fundamental right of
the community, medical or general, to expect their members to live up to their
obligations. The practice of medicine is not a right, but a privilege extended to
members of the community. That privilege is extended to members that observe
and live up to obligations that correlate to that privilege. It is the community's
right to demand obligatory performance in certain areas. This is well grounded
in law. The moral duty is owed by the physician to the community, for the
privilege of practicing medicine within that community.
This section has presented a moral argument grounded in Communitarian
Philosophy. The ‘greater community of good', however that is established, is
the foundation for this justification. Individual and community concems must be
balanced in order to achieve an overall social well-being. Without upholding
the moral obligation the physician owes to the community, he places himself in
a position where he jeopardizes, not oniy the community's, but his own welfare.
In the next chapter, we will argue, from an Aristotelian viewpoint, how the
physician risks his own well-being by not seeking a conciiiatory position.
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CHAPTER 7

W ell-being Justification
The conflicts that seem to arise within the medical community itself are more
than just how to deal with the AIDS-afflicted health care worker and his or her
ability to deliver safe and effective treatment to patients entrusted to their care.
The argument in this chapter w ill show that by nor choosing a position that
assures the appropriate moral conduct for the individual surgeon, he or she
risks their own moral destruction. The chapter will argue for conduct that
assures that this destruction does not occur. It is the true "high moral
ground". When actions of an individual serve both the community aspects
of right moral conduct and also serves to assure the ultimate 'well-being'
of the individual by this conduct, then a truly virtuous or morally whole person
has arisen. This is the ultim ate moral argument - that of an individual, acting
in his or her own behalf, and contributing to the 'common good*.
The physician, specifically the surgeon, is mandated by the m ost recent
Code of Professional Ethics, published by the AM A and the recommendations
set down by the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, to refrain from the
performance of 'invasive procedures’ on patients if the doctor or surgeon is
infected with AIDS.^ The problem arises when the surgeon refuses to refrain
from these procedures.
103
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Many arguments have been brought forth in favor of the surgeon’s discretion.
These arguments, in the language o f protection from discrimination through the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the fact that the health care worker,
in general, is more at risk of acquiring the disease from the patient than the
patient is from acquiring it from the health care worker, only seek to divert the
real issue of protecting the patient from further or greater harm. None of these
arguments circum vent the ethical responsibility of the surgeon not to subject his
patients to any more risk than is reasonable and to inform them com pletely of
any and all such risks. While the risk of acquiring AIDS from an infected
surgeon may be remote, the catastrophic consequences warrant disclosure.
Disclosure is tantamount to suspension of surgical privileges and will, in
essence, remove the surgeon’s ability to eam a living from surgery. The result
is that the AIDS-afflicted surgeon has been driven 'underground' with his
affliction by not disclosing. By doing this he or she has removed all available
efforts and resources of support, both emotional for dealing with the affliction,
and governmental in the protective legislation now in effect. He has effectively
isolated him self from all elements of his society, his colleagues, his patients,
and possibly even his family and friends. This legislation, albeit broadsweeping
in nature, protects those Infected with a communicable disease from many
forms of discrim ination including, but not limited to, employment, and housing
(Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the ADA). Disclosure assures that the afflicted
physician receives all the available protection that the law will afford him.
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Achieving well-being is the end and meaning of the concept of being human;
it is the fullest realization of the human function as outlined by Aristotle in the
Nicomachean Ethics. ^ The function of a man is to be actively exercising the
rational faculties of the 'soul'; the function of the good man is the activity of the
soul in conformance with virtue or excellence of standards. Just as the harp
player's function is to play the harp, the good harpist's function is to play well;
therefore, the good man is distinguished from man, in general, by his
conformity with excellence or virtue in his actions (N.E. I. vii. 14-15).
Virtue, as defined by Aristotle, is the observance of the moral mean, the state
between two vices, that of excess and deficiency, and it is a middle point in
feelings and actions. T h is is why it is a hard task to be good, for it is hard to find
the middle point in anything".

For in observing the mean, the actions and

emotions have to be focused on the right person, at the proper time and in the
right amount, in the correct way, and for the proper purpose (N.E. II. vi. 16, II. xi.
2). If at any time the surgeon were to focus the actions and emotions of a
particular decision on anyone other than the patient, the physician risks
committing an unethical act.
The effort of the good man must also occupy a lifetim e and not merely be a
passing activity.

For the physician/surgeon whose life's function is dedicated to

the health of his patients, the inability to fulfill his function in life must make him
truly unhappy (N.E. I. vii. 16). This is not to say that all AIDS-afflicted surgeons
are unhappy. Those that focus the activity away from direct patient care or
invasive procedures, may be able to fulfill their human function well, for "no
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supremely happy man can ever become miserable* and the "truly good ...man
will bear all kinds of (mis)fortune... and will always act in the noblest manner
that the circumstances will allow" (N.E. I. x. 13). This makes poignant the
examination of the case of the AIDS-afflicted surgeon who refuses to refrain
from the performance of invasive procedures, and therefore participates in
harmful or base actions. Such a person would become a supremely unhappy
man. unable to fulfill his function as a human.
The discrepancy between why certain afflicted surgeons achieve well-being
and others do not, lies in the approach each uses to the activity. Aristotle
argues for three general human character dispositions, two of vice and one of
virtue (N.E. II. viii. 1). Virtuous actions constitute achieving the 'mean', the point
between the vices of excess and deficiency, those of neither too little nor too
much. The two dispositions of excess and deficiency are what the good man
seeks to avoid.

By the mean, Aristotle would also say that the concept is

relative to each individual. (This is opposed to the mathematical mean between
any two quantities.) As in the amount of exercise needed for the body - too little
and the body may atrophy, too much will cause injury - so too, any expert in any
art will seek to avoid the excess and deficiency and seek and adopt the mean,
relative to that individual in that kind of action (N.E. II. vi. 6,7,8.). For the AIDSafflicted surgeon there must be a moral mean by which he is able to fulfill his
life's work and protect the health and welfare of the patient population as well.
The vices of this individual appear clear, although each may be argued at
either end of the spectrum, of excess or deficiency. In the deficiency, the
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physician would refrain from all practice of medicine and leam another art that
may satisfy his needs for well-being as a human. While this appears, on the
surface, to be an acceptable course of action to the patient population, the
surgeon would ultimately see his life's work destroyed and be unhappy. As in
the despair of the writer told that he can no longer write, or the artist told that he
can no longer paint or sculpt, so the physician is subjected to his own
destruction.
We can also argue that deficiency of action constitutes vice. For the
physician who refuses to suspend or modify his existing practice, in deference
to patient safety, practices a deficiency of the morally right action. There is no
firm ethical basis by which this physician can claim to be acting in a virtuous
manner, for if seeking the mean constitutes virtue and the mean lies between
excess and deficiency, there can be no mean in the vices themselves (N.E. II. vi.
20.). By refusing to act, the physician has committed a base action fo r no
deficiency can have a mean.
On the other side of the mean, the surgeon who continues to practice could
be considered to participate in excess. In this model the surgeon continues to
operate without interference and reaps all the benefits of maintaining his
surgical practice including the monetary rewards and prestige associated with
being a surgeon. By assuming that he must give up ail the associated benefits
that go with being a surgeon, he refuses for selfish reasons to disclose his
affliction, and participates in reaping an excess of that to which he is entitled.
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We can also argue moral excess from the other end of the spectrum. The
surgeon who completely suspends the practice of medicine (because he feels
that he can no longer provide for his patients in a safe manner) also can be said
to participate in a form of the vice of excess. From an epidemiological
standpoint, this is a true excess of action. For the reality of the nature of the
disease and the transmission of same would not involve severing complete
contact with patients, only contact that could be deemed invasive or any other
manner that may compromise the patient's safety. Using an Aristotelian
example of Cowardice and Rashness, the physician who totally refuses to
disclose his affliction in his own self interest could be considered a coward and
he who totally suspends the medical practice, rash. The mean for the afflicted
physician would be the Courage to find some form of medicine that does not
involve ‘invasive’ patient care. For the surgeon it may be research or teaching,
as there are many avenues of medical practice that do not involve ‘invasive’
patient care. In fact the vast majority of the practice of medicine does not
involve invasive procedures’. It further fits Aristotle's definition in the fact that
the cowardice of inaction is greatly m ore opposed than the rashness of
complete suspension. Complete suspension would be a safer course than that
of inaction, and therefore the rashness is closer to the mean of courage and the
cowardice of inaction more opposed (N.E. II. viii. 5-8).
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Justice
The discussion must also contain the aspects of justice, that of a universal
concept of the whole of virtue, and the universal concept of the whole of vice.
The sense of fairness, or justice, has a history that dates to pre-Socratic Greece.
"Justice (Sike) consisted in everything [having its own assigned place and]
staying in it's assigned place, and not usurping the place of another” (Feinberg
and Gross 1986, 333). ' We will dismiss the aspects of justice in a distributive
(monetary or lawful) sense as irrelevant to the discussion at hand, since they
offer no impact on the central issues being examined. Although the monetary
aspects of the highly paid surgeon might be discussed, they are best saved for
another forum.
The practice of virtue toward someone else is the concept of universal
justice, and the contrary of the practice of vice toward another is universal
injustice. Aristotle defines particular justice in two forms, that of distributive
justice and corrective justice. It is the latter that will be examined first in this
discussion, although a distributive argument will be offered later in the chapter.
Corrective justice will only consider "the nature of the damage done, treating the
parties as equal, and merely asking whether one has done and the other
suffered injustice, whether one has inflicted and the other has sustained
damage" (N.E. V. iv. 3).
This model is applicable to the physician / patient example we have been
using, although the application will be strained. For the physician who infects a
patient, although the resultant infection was not of a deliberate nature (this is an
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assumption that must be made because the ethical platform would never
support the concept of murder), the patient is harmed as a result of the doctor's
actions. This is an injustice on the part of the physician, one that is presumably
uncorrectable from an equity standpoint, and so must fall into the universal
category of injustice, that of vice toward another. For the concept of this form of
particular justice to apply, the assumption that both parties be considered
equals must be upheld. But this equity cannot be assumed from a pure moral
standpoint. This equity assumption could be a reasonable attack within a civil
court of law, but even then, the universal injustice of vice toward another will
apply because of the special (some would say even intimate) relationship
between doctor and patient. The physician is placed in a position of trust, that
he or she will stand by their oath and seek to preserve the health and welfare of
their patients. When the physician places the patient at risk, a risk that could
have been avoided or completely eliminated, he violates his basic oath as a
physician and commits the most heinous of injustices. "Justice is that quality in
virtue of which a man is said to be disposed to do by deliberate choice that
which is just” (N.E. V. v. 17).
In order adequately to examine the concept of choice, the actions must first
be determined to be under the control of the individual committing the acts. If
the physician were to argue that the actions, that of participating in the invasive
care of the patients, were compulsory and involuntary in nature, he would have
to argue that the action or the reason for the action lies outside of the agent
committing the act. To argue that societal blackballing and the monetary
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hardship imposed on the AIDS-afflicted physician makes his actions based on
compulsion is not a view that holds up under scrutiny. For no matter how much
this hardship could be, it does not meet the criteria for acts under compulsion. It
is not outside of the control of the agent, he does not have a fear of a worse
alternative, other than his own displeasure, and the given circumstances do not
warrant the deliberate choice of the base action; for the base action, that of
placing the patient at risk, is worse than the hardship argued for the compulsion.
For the actions to be considered of a mixed nature (also intrinsically involuntary
in scope), the actions must pose too great a hardship or strain for the agent to
endure (N.E. III. i. 7). The hardship (monetary o r otherwise) imposed on the
physician, that of the suspension of surgical practice, has been clearly shown to
be not one of the virtuous choices but one of the vices. The choice of the
physician to claim to have to substitute one vice fo r another in the defense of his
actions is clearly choosing the worse of the two by continuing to practice. As
has been shown, cowardice is further from courage than rashness.
Yet these actions do seem to fall under the class of 'mixed' actions, for "there
seem to be some acts which a man cannot be com pelled to do, and rather than
do them he ought to submit to the most terrible death" (N.E. ill. i. 8). The
physician who claims that his actions are involuntary and blames external
influences and claims no origination for the action argues from the absurd. He
refuses to take responsibility for falling easy prey to his own passions and
desires, and tries to blame the disgraceful actions on the temptations from
external forces. The actions of this nature are clearly voluntary in nature for the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112
nature of the action originates within the agent. It is the choice of the physician,
knowing the particular circumstances in which he is acting, that will constitute
the virtue or the vice ( N.E. III. i. 11,20).
Choice is defined as "voluntary action preceded by deliberation" (N.E. III. ii.
17). The deliberative aspects are related to things which are within our control.
We do not deliberate about insensible things as the fool or the madman, about
regular or irregular occurrences, or about chance items or those that are
eternal. "We deliberate (only) about that which is in our control and is attainable
by action” (N.E. III. iii. 7). Since the action is an essential part of the deliberative
process (for no one would deliberate about things that are unattainable for that
would be mere wishing), it must follow that it is the means upon which
deliberation is focused, as opposed to the end. The end is just that, the end,
and no action is attributed to the end. "A doctor does not deliberate whether he
is to cure his patient” , he deliberates about the actions that will achieve the goal
of curing him and these actions must be attainable or reasonable (N.E. III.
1.11,15). This deliberation must not be without correctness, for deliberation that
arrives at wrong or improper conclusions or aims at m isdirected goals is said to
be deficient of excellence.
Deliberative excellence involves a process of investigation and calculation
and, by the action of choice, arriving at something good. For deliberative
excellence to be achieved, what qualities must be attributed to the process?
First, the deliberation must span a certain amount of time, for no true decisions
are made on the spur of the moment (except by trained habit). We must reach
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the right conclusion for, obviously, if we reach the wrong conclusion there has
been a fault within the deliberative process; and it follows that we must reach it
on the right grounds and at the right time. Improper grounds, or the wrong
reasons, render the reasoning flawed as decisions delayed are often decisions
and opportunities lost. For a man to judge whether his deliberation is good
(deliberative excellence) he employs understanding o r the capacity to judge
rightly. He must also be considerate or forgiving of others and be able to judge
rightly what are the equitable solutions essential to achieving the action
necessary to reach the proper conclusion. This is the prudent man. One who
through the correctness of deliberation and consideration of others, arrives at
an equitable solution on the right grounds, at the right tim e, and in the right
manner is said to be prudent. Prudence is the action employing all of these
features and the correct action is said to be the virtuous one if employed with
prudence. One does not achieve prudence easily for many factors contribute to
the acquisition of this nature.
It should suffice to say that experience, consideration, deliberative
excellence, and equitable judgment are the marks of the prudent man. So in
the case of the physician who reaches for the solution to the dilemma of
continuing his medical practice and placing his patients at risk, or to seek some
reasonable alternative and still achieve the human function, the complete
process must conform to a set of actions determined by a principle as defined
by the prudent man. This is how the process of choice is determined, and
correct choice leads to the correct actions. These actions, correctly deliberated.
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considered, and judged to be equitable, will produce a virtuous end (N.E. VI.).
The rights of special individuals, those of disability rights, and aspects of
autonomy must be taken into account. The quandary produced when the moral
theories and these ‘rights’ come into conflict is readily apparent in contemporary
society. The concept of equity as a form of fairness, and perceived injustices
based on the violation of the aforementioned rights is the basis for much of the
discussion.
Now we must look at the aspects of distributive justice as they apply to the
practical workings of moral theory. The issue central to the disabled community
with regards to legislation is the ‘equal’ opportunity to participate in the vast
amount that society has to offer all other individuals not so afflicted and to be
afforded the necessary accommodations to facilitate this participation. This
equity, as the disabled community would view it, is something that is long in
coming. This equity is the mean against a slew of continual injustices that has
always plagued the disabled community.
The Aristotelian view is that "Justice is a mode of observing the mean...", and
for the disabied individuals they live a form of injustice because "Injustice is
related to the extremes” (NE, V. v. 17). That is, disabled living is an extreme
when ‘normal’ functioning is prohibited due to curbs at the sidewalk and stairs
in a building. This may be best viewed as a function of and within the realm of
Political Justice. The application of political justice for the disabled individual is
the scrutiny of the basic inequities of opportunity that exist by convention. The
"administration of law” and the deciding of "what is just and what is unjust" is the
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application of political justice (NE, V. vi, 4). Paul Schollm eier states it best when
he relates the concept of well-being associated with political justice.
Both lawful men and fair men wish for and act for the well-being of others.
And to wish and to act for the [well-being] of others is the first mark of
friendship. What is lawful aims at the actions required for the [well-being]
of others, and what is fair aims at the distribution of goods necessary for
the [well-being] of others or at the rectification of the distribution of these
goods (Schollmeier 1984,104). "
Prof. Schollmeier continues with the assertion that both justice and political
friendship have the same motives and objects of focus. "Just people are thus
other selves to one another, numerically different and morally the same” and
"people find the [well-being] of one another to be an object of pleasant
apperception” (Schollmeier 1994, 104). This reciprocal good feeling toward
one another and recognition of individual worth (autonomy) coupled with a
mean that is similar in substance (between justice and friendship) is the basis
for political justice and friendship (Schollmeier 1994, 105).
This chapter’s discussion has revolved around correct actions of the prudent
man and that of the complete performance, man’s proper function, a kind of
activity inherently fulfilling, "evSainovia” or well-being. Using the process of
choice, the informed physician (and about disease, whether infected or not, the
physician must be considered informed) by choosing the path of either non
disclosure or the complete suspension of practice chooses vice and therefore
will not accomplish the human function at its best, that is, his own well-being.
Choosing to suspend practice would only impact the physician and while it will
not lead to well-being, it is probably the lesser of two evils. Yet the physician
who continues to practice without the knowledge or consent of his patients
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commits an injustice of the greatest sort, an injustice against his fellow man, a
universal injustice. When a man, property informed, through the process of
deliberation, chooses an action that could only be considered base, he
contributes to his own moral self-destruction. When he is fully aware of the
situation, of the risks, consequences, and resultant potential outcomes, yet he
still chooses vice, then he can never be truly happy. One can go even further
and say that being in a position of trust, the physician has the moral obligation,
based on his oath as a physician, and the true intim acy of the physician / patient
relationship not to practice actions considered dangerous or to place the patient
at risk to situations that can be avoided. This is fa r superior to the common risks
associated with surgical procedures, as those are informed risks and the patient
is fully aware of these and they are outlined and discussed prior to the
performance of any invasion. Here the physician stands on the soapbox of
epidemiology and makes the argument that he is only obligated to inform the
patient of any 'significant risks', and that the risk of his transmitting the disease
is too remote to be considered significant. He fails in this analysis because he
does not let the patient achieve the same level of choice, through the
deliberative process, that he has been allowed to pursue.

He has, in essence,

chosen to focus the action and emotional reasoning on the "\vrong” person. He
does not allow the patient's needs to take precedence over his own and
therefore cannot be morally justified. If he informed the patient of the remote
chance of cross infection and the patient chose to keep the surgeon, both
choices would be m orally justifiable.
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One additional argument in our discussion of the ethically whole person is
that the physician who has AIDS might be obligated to refrain from the practice
of medicine entirely because of the possibility that the practitioner may infect the
patient, and such an act would be in itself base. For a surgeon willfully to
subject a patient to the potential risk of death without the expressed written
consent of the patient would constitute either malice or even murder if the
patient were to become infected. These are actions that have no possible moral
mean to observe, and are by their very nature, evil actions. Blatantly evil
actions cannot be tolerated, much less recommended. They would be a true,
universal injustice, not only from the level of activity, but from the level of one's
entire being. Such a physician would be an evil individual. ^
Finger pointing at this stage in the argument would be ill-timed, and I do not
wish to make a case for murderous actions. This is brought out only as an aside
that is most ugly at best. Some individuals have been charged with attempted
murder of police officers for biting and scratching these officers when they are
known HIV positive cases. A similar action could be brought against individuals
who place someone at risk of great bodily injury without their 'informed'
consent It is a trap that the medical community should wish to avoid at all costs.
A strong advocacy of complete suspension from practice would also be
inappropriate now, given all that has been said in the previous pages, but we
must make one distinction clear - there can be no morally justifiable decision
regarding HIV infection that leads to willfully risking patient safety without
informed consent. Moral integrity is concomitant with moral well-being. Afflicted
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and non-affiicted physicians alike would have to deliberate on the risk of
infecting a patient with HIV. This deliberative excellence is essential for the
morally whole individual to effectively choose right" action. They owe it to
themselves, their profession, and the community at large to give this important
topic its just and rightful merit. Individual surgeon’s choices are personal on first
reflection, but are also constitutive, each in its way, of the moral quality of the
community as well.

Thus community well-being and a morally cooperative and

supportive community needs just moral choices from its members, including
physicians. This cooperative effort, that is strictly dependent on the just moral
actions of the individual, is the key to the well-being of the community at large.
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Chapter Notes

1. The term physician" and ‘surgeon" shall be used interchangeably as all
surgeons must be physicians and all physicians are trained as surgeons.
Specialty surgeons m ay have greater training in specialized areas, but this
does not impact the discussion or this qualifier. The term ‘AIDS" shall be used
generically to refer to all individuals who have AIDS, are HIV positive, or are
afflicted with any disturbance to the immune system associated with the Human
Immunodeficiency V irus (HIV).
2. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1926). All notations within the text will be from this
edition and will be referenced by (N.E., followed by the text citation).
3. Joel Feinberg, Hyman Gross, Philosophy o f Law, Third Edition;
(Wadsworth Publishing, 1986), 333.
4. Paul Schollmeier, Other Selves, Aristotle on Personal and Political
Friendship, (Albany. State University of New York Press, 1994).
5. See: Dennis L. Breo, "The dental AIDS cases-Murder or an unsolvable
mystery?”, J. Am. Med. A. (JAMA), (December 8, 1993), v. 270, no. 22; reference
also: Kimberly Bergaiis / David Acer, D.D.S.
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CHAPTER 8

Conclusion
This thesis has centered around the surgeon who is HIV positive. W e have
attempted to show the need for a real change in current policy because of four
main arguments. When a public health epidemic causes concern over the risks
of disease transmission, then corrective action that is reasonable, sensible, and
plausible must be offered. This work has attempted to do just that. There are
many objections to what has been offered in this thesis and I have attem pted to
address those objections in a straight-forward manner, but in no way did I try to
appease all of the players involved. I have merely tried to be as fair-m inded as
possible given the real problem within the healthcare arena. Fear of disease
transmission on both sides of the spectrum, whether it is from the occupational
side of the provider or from the patient side, has brought a degree o f paralysis to
the healthcare system.

Rights and Responsibilities
Rights and responsibilities must always go hand-in-hand. One w ithout the
other leaves its counter hanging by a thread of accountability. As we have
shown, people have a natural right to life and this right can never be
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taken away from them. The issue of a patient’s right to this life is the firm ground
on which healthcare is based using the autonomy model. Those seeking to
violate these rights negate their responsibility to the patient. Patients cannot be
relieved of this autonomous consideration. The medical community cannot
decide for the patients what is best for them. This paternalistic treatment is
contrary to autonomous consideration of the patient and makes the patient only
an object of the physician's orders. This is unacceptable.
If HIV positive healthcare providers seek to practice in an ‘exposure prone'
environment, then they have a moral responsibility not to cross-infect their
patients. The responsibility is dual. They have a duty to the patient for his or
her life and a duty to the community in fighting the epidemic. The community’s
rights cannot go understated and are part of the strong moral tone of this work.
We, as members of society, have a strong moral obligation to require that those
who have the privilege of practicing medicine in our society, do not risk our lives
when given this privilege, regardless of their intent. Rights, or privileges,
without correlative responsibilities, or duties, cannot be justified.

Disability Law and Legislation
We have attempted to give ia\r treatment to current disability laws. We also
believe that the current laws are more than complete in the protections of the
HIV positive com m unity their rights against discrimination must be guarded
zealously. Court decisions in A iiine and C halk have succeeded in this
protection. This also has shown that these HIV positive individuals, while
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included in §504 and the ADA, cannot show that they are ‘otherwise qualified'
and absent of direct threat* in specific areas, particularly in the surgical theater.
The use of common law in Behringer and Doe show that the courts are
unwilling to allow the potential risk of transmission to be subjected to unwilling
patients. Canons of ‘informed consent" have been applied to surgeons seeking
to continue to practice and it has been argued that this doctrine is discriminatory
against handicapped individuals. The counter argument considered in Chapter
Three has been based on the assessment of risk and what constitutes real risk
from an epidemiological basis. The failure of this argument is in the statistical
analysis where the effort to totally eliminate the risk of m ortality due to diseaise
transmission cannot be accomplished. Remote or not, transmission is possible
and given the pandemic nature of the problem and the real percutaneous injury
risk to surgical practitioners, they cannot be considered to be absent of direct
threat'. This is also applicable to the student surgeon and raises even a
stronger risk from the inexperienced or surgical trainee.
When drafting these laws, legislators raised concerns about inclusion of
individuals based on membership in high risk groups. W hile these arguments
may feed the hysteria surrounding this disease, they are truly misplaced. In
general, the wording of the laws m ay allow inclusion of these individuals if they
are “perceived as having the disease”, but this inclusion has no real impact on
the overall effect of the legislation. The current laws have enough flexibility to
assure fair and unbiased treatment for a ll infected individuals, physicians and
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surgeons included, will be afforded given the current trend of cases testing
these pieces of legislation.
The rights of disabled individuals must be observed so as not to drive the
afflicted underground and Into hiding because of their infected status. This
does not relieve the community from protecting its constituents. The continued,
above-board approach to the tracking of the virus must be lasting and the public
health agencies must be afforded the tools and the resources to facilitate this
effort

Policy
All of this said in no way offers a different course of action than the proposed
change in policy presented in Chapter Five. The proposed policy has four
different components;
I) Professional associations, specifically the American Medical Association
and the American Dental Association, must collaborate with their scientific
colleagues to specifically determine which procedures in healthcare
delivery are determined to be ‘exposure prone'.
The professional associations, as well as the Centers for Disease Control, have
not defined which procedures are to be considered ‘exposure prone'. This
lapse in official policy must be corrected. If the associations are to continue to
argue that they are the best guardians of their own affairs then they, and only
they, can determine what is considered ‘exposure prone' and what is not. I also
argue that, in the absence of action by the professional association, the CDC
should take the lead and make this determination. The reluctance by the CDC
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is based on the close and necessary participation by the associations in the
overall goals of the Centers. This does not relieve their moral obligation.
II) Professional associations must place into their individual policy,
procedure, and ethical platforms specific guidelines for HIV positive
physicians and surgeons as to when they can and when they cannot
perform procedures on patients.
The ambiguous language in the AMA’s policy compendium regarding actions
that the afflicted surgeon should do and what a local review committee m ay do
serves no useful purpose except to offer alternatives that step away from sound
moral judgment. When the AMA policy dictates that “when the scientific data
are unclear [regarding the real risk of transmission], it is m andatory that the
rights of the patient take precedence over those of the physician”, it is difficult to
understand why a stronger stand has not been taken regarding what the HIV
positive surgeon w ill do regarding continuation of a surgical practice involved in
‘exposure prone" procedures.
III) Surgical licensure to perform 'exposure prone’ procedures shall be tied
to HIV testing. Any qualified provider may apply fo r licensure, but those
testing positive to HIV (and possibly HbV) will be required to obtain
‘informed consent" from the patients undergoing the aforementioned
‘exposure prone" procedures.
The proposed policy’s mandate of surgical licensure tied to testing does not
argue mandatory testing for all surgical providers, only those who wish to
participate in exposure prone procedures. This is a critical distinction that
underscores the need for the existing ambiguity to be elim inated regarding that
performance. The tracking and clearing should be done using a national data
base (so as to elim inate the need for state to state reciprocity and tracking) as a
cost effective measure.

It is possible that the professional associations may be
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charged with this duty, but the effort could be better handled by the Centers for
Disease Control. Not only would this help in the tracking of the HIV epidemic, it
would also track, as part of the disease control, another occupation that may be
shown to be “at risk” for the acquisition of the virus.
IV) Create a “bank" of HIV positive physicians and surgeons. Each “bank”
will be regionally located to be called to perform ‘exposure prone"
procedures on known HIV positive cases, if time w ill permit.
When proposing the concept of a bank" of HIV positive surgeons, the model
has two sides and offers possibilities to those HIV positive surgeons still wishing
to contribute. The first is for the surgeons still to be able to practice their craft
and help their patients, and second, for the HIV positive surgeons to assist their
colleagues in preventing further occupational contamination. This conceptual
model can be well funded by governmental dollars and is a reasonable
alternative when time allows. They must also be extremely well paid,
eliminating the need to go underground for monetary reasons.

Moral Justification
The moral justification for this argument has taken on two different concepts,
both logically sound. Community concerns and rights are central to the issues.
We as a community have the right to demand that physicians live up to their
moral obligations. It is our duty, then, to see that this happens, regardless of
their reluctance to do so. The community has the right to be protected from
potentially dangerous individuals seeking to place their rights above their
responsibilities. We are not unsympathetic to their predicament, only to their
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attempt to become a “moral exception”. Their unique status will not relieve them
of their moral obligation to the community good. Their 'professional' status only
reinforces this concept. The proposed policy also protects the HIV positive
individual surgeon and places his welfare at the forefront with the creation of the
HIV positive bank" of providers. He or she is given an avenue by which
effectively to contribute as active members of the community. This is a desirable
component of community membership, to contribute to the good of the polis.
The Aristotelian moral justification in Chapter Seven shows how the surgeon,
by not refraining from risk orientated behavior, contributes to his or her own
moral destruction. The physician's moral choices, relative to his or her
alteration of their medical practice in deference to patient safety is critical to their
own moral well-being. Individual healthy moral foundation is an essential
component and cannot be allowed to deteriorate, especially when more is at
stake than the individuals themselves. The community, also, should not
condone this - moral destruction o f the individual will ultimately lead to the
destruction of the moral fabric of the whole community. The community’s fight is
ongoing in this area as we fight crim e and substance abuse, and seek to
promote education and social responsibility. This is the larger moral argument,
both from a personal standpoint and a community of good. Community rights
aside, this moral obligation of the community must prevail in the defense of its
members. It is the only possible outcome that serves the moral good of the
membership.
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Epilogue
I have attempted to offend no one. But this policy stand obviously will. My
intent is to seek a workable alternative to existing policy, which is woefully
inadequate. I take the moral high ground because the quagmire of the statistics
and laws has obscured the vision of ‘right action' in the given scenario. The
stand I take is based on what actions physicians should do based on a moral
obligation to themselves and to the community as a whole. When they attem pt
to avoid or side-step this moral obligation, we as a community must see that
they face these responsibilities. This thesis has undertaken to argue for that
policy and moral judgment.
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